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1WOULD BANNING FIREARMS REDUCE MURDER AND SUICIDE?  
A REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
 




The world abounds in instruments with which people can kill each other. Is the 
widespread availability of one of these instruments, firearms, a crucial determinant of the 
incidence of murder? Or do patterns of murder and/or violent crime reflect basic socio-economic 
and/or cultural factors to which the mere availability of one particular form of weaponry is 
irrelevant? 
 
This article examines a broad range of international data that bear on two distinct but 
interrelated questions: first, whether widespread firearm access is an important contributing 
factor in murder and/or suicide, and second, whether the introduction of laws that restrict general 
access to firearms has been successful in reducing violent crime, homicide or suicide. Our 
conclusion from the available data is that suicide, murder and violent crime rates are determined 
by basic social, economic and/or cultural factors with the availability of any particular one of the 
world’s myriad deadly instrument being irrelevant. 
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6It was not the presence of the rifle that provoked the homicide: Murderous technology is available 
everywhere, in every kitchen and every garage; an axe or a knife, a bottle or a car would have 
accomplished the same end. It is the will to use that technology that is culturally coded... this is 
what shapes the number of homicidal assaults in a nation."1
INTRODUCTION 
 The world abounds in instruments with which people can kill each other. Is the 
widespread availability of one of these instruments, firearms, a crucial determinant of the 
incidence of murder? Or do patterns of murder and/or violent crime reflect basic socio-economic 
and/or cultural factors to which the mere availability of one particular form of weaponry is 
irrelevant? 
 International evidence and comparisons have long been offered as proof of the mantra 
more guns = more death/fewer guns = less death.2 Unfortunately such discussions have all too 
 
1 C. Gabrielle Salfati & Evangelos Haratsis, "Greek Homicide: A Behavioral Examination" quoting 
Canadian anthropologist  Elliott Leyton. 5 HOMICIDE STUDIES 335, 337 (2001). 
 2 John Godwin, MURDER USA: THE WAYS WE KILL EACH OTHER 281 (1979) (“Areas with the 
highest proportion of gun owner also boast the highest homicide ratios; those with the fewest gun owners have the 
lowest.”),  Nelson "Pete" Shields, GUNS DON'T DIE, PEOPLE DO 64 (N.Y.: Arbor House, 1981) (quoting and 
endorsing an English academic’s  remark “We can’t help but believe that America ought to share the basic premise 
of our gun legislation – that the availability of firearms breeds violence.”). To the same effect see e.g. Janice 
Somerville, "Gun Control as Immunization," AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS January 3, 1994, p. 9 (quoting public 
health activist Katherine Christoffel, M.D: “Guns are a virus that must be eradicated.... Get rid of the guns, get rid of 
the bullets, and you get rid of the deaths.");  Deane Calhoun, "From Controversy to Prevention: Building Effective 
Firearm Policies", INJURY PREVENTION NETWORK NEWSLETTER, Winter, 1989-90, at p. 17 ("guns are not 
just an inanimate object, but in fact are a social ill.");  see also Paul Cotton, "Gun-Associated Violence Increasingly 
7often been afflicted by misconceptions, factual error and focus on comparisons that are 
unrepresentative. It may be useful to begin with a few examples. One is the compound assertion 
that: (a) guns are uniquely available in the U.S. compared  to other modern developed nations, 
which is why (b) the U.S. has by far the highest murder rate. 
 Though this has been endlessly repeated, in fact, b) is false and a) substantially so. The 
false assertion that the U.S. has the industrialized world’s highest murder rate is an artifact of 
politically motivated Soviet minimization of true Russian homicide rates since at least 1965.  As 
of many years before that date Russia had extremely stringent gun controls3 which were 
effectuated by a police state apparatus providing for extremely stringent enforcement.4 So 
successful was that regime that few Russian civilians have firearms and very few murders involve 
 
Viewed as Public Health Challenge," 267 JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association) 1171-1174 (1992) 
at 171; Susan Baker, "Without Guns Do People Kill People?" 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 587 (1985); Diane 
Schetky, "Children and Handguns: A Public Health Concern", 139 AM. J. DIS. OF CHILD. 229, 230;Lois A. 
FINGERHUT and Joel C. KLEINMAN "International and Interstate Comparisons of Homicides Among Young 
Males." 263 JAMA 3292, 3295 (1990), Wendy Cukier and Victor W. Sidel, THE GLOBAL GUN EPIDEMIC, 
FROM SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALS TO AK–47S. Praeger Security International, Westport Conn., 2006. 
 3 George Newton &  Franklin Zimring, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE at p. 119ff., 
especially note 3 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Print. Off.: 1970). 
 4 Russian law did and does flatly prohibit civilian possession of handguns and limits long guns to licensed 
hunters. Id. As to stringency of enforcement see Raymond Kessler, "Gun Control and Political Power", 5 LAW & 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 381 (1983) and Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, "Under Fire: The New Consensus on the 
Second Amendment," 45 EMORY L. J. 1139 (1996) at 1239 (Noting, among others, an unusual further element of  
Russian gun policy in that  the Soviet Army adopted unique firearm calibers so that, even if its soldiers could not be 
prevented from  returning with foreign gun souvenirs from foreign wars, ammunition for them would be unavailable 
in Russia). 
8them.5
Yet manifest success in keeping its people disarmed has not prevented Russia from having 
far and away the highest murder rate in the developed world.6 In the 1960s and early ‘70s, gun-
less Russia’s murder rates paralleled (generally exceeded) those of gun-ridden America. As 
American rates first stabilized and then steeply declined, Russian murder increased so drastically 
that by the early 1990s the Russian rate was three times higher than the U.S. As of 1998-2004 (the 
latest figure available for Russia) Russian murder rates were nearly four times higher than 
American. Much higher murder rates than the U.S. ever had also characterize the Ukraine, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and various other now-independent European parts of the former 
U.S.S.R.7 Thus in the U.S., the former Soviet Union, and current-day Russia, “homicide results 
 
5 Pridemore, William A. 2001. "Using Newly Available Homicide Data to Debunk Two Myths About 
Violence in an International Context: A Research Note."  HOMICIDE STUDIES v. 5, pp. 267-275 (2001). 
 6Russian homicide data given in this article were kindly supplied us by Prof. Pridemore from his research in 
Russian ministry sources. 
 7 The highest the U.S. homicide rate ever reported was 10.5 per 100,000 population (1980). As of 2001 the 
rate was below 6. The latest rates we have for Ukraine, Belarus, and other former Soviet nations in Europe come 
from the mid-1990s when all were well above 10 and most were 50% to 150% higher. See rates given in Jeffrey A. 
Miron, “Violence, Guns, and Drugs: A Cross-Country Analysis,” 44 J. LAW & ECON, pp. 615, 625ff. (2001).  
 Note: the U.S. rates given above are FBI reported rates. There are two different sources of U.S. murder rates. 
The FBI has murder data based on reports it obtains from police agencies throughout the nation. These data are 
slightly less complete than the alternative (used in this article unless otherwise expressly stated) rates of the U.S. 
Public Health Service deriving from data collected from medical examiners’ offices nationwide. Though the latter 
data are more comprehensive, and the Public Health Service murder rate is slightly higher, they have the 
disadvantage of being slower to appear than the FBI homicide data. 
9suggest that where guns are scarce other weapons are substituted in killings.8”
While American gun ownership is quite high, Table 1 infra shows many other developed 
nations (e.g., Norway, Finland, Germany, France, Switzerland, Greece, Denmark) with high gun 
availability yet murder rates as low as, and often much lower than, developed nations where guns 
are far fewer. For example, Luxembourg, where handguns are totally banned and ownership of 
any kind of gun is minimal, has a murder rate 10 times higher than gun-dense Norway and 
Germany where handguns are legal and gun ownership in general is very high.9
++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Table 1 about here 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
The same pattern appears when comparisons of violence to gun ownership are made 
within nations. Indeed, "data on firearms ownership by constabulary area in England" show "a 
negative correlation,"10 i.e. "where firearms are most dense, violent crime rates are lowest, and 
 
8 Gary Kleck, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL (NY, Aldine: 1997) p. 20 
(discussing patterns revealed by studies in the U.S.). 
 9 Luxembourg’s murder rate is one third higher than the U.S. rate for 1999-2003 of approximately 6.1 
murders per 100,000 population.  
 Our assertions as to legality of handguns are based on United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, [Draft] UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL STUDY 
ON FIREARMS REGULATION prepared as of 1997 at p.26, table 2.1. 
 10 Joyce Lee Malcolm, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE (Harvard, 2002),  p. 204. 
10 
where guns are least dense violent crime rates are highest" (quoting a description of what 
American data have also consistently shown).11 Many different data sets from various kinds of 
sources are summarized as follows by the leading text: 
... there is no consistent significant positive association between gun ownership 
levels and violence rates: across (1) time within the United States; (2) U.S. cities; 
(3) counties within Illinois; (4) country-sized areas like England; (U.S. states; (5) 
regions of the United States; (6) nations; or (7) population subgroups ....12 
A second misconception about the relationship between firearms and violence attributes 
Europe’s generally low homicide rates to stringent gun control. That attribution cannot be 
 
11 Hans Toch & Alan Lizotte, "Research and Policy: The Case of Gun Control", in PSYCHOLOGY AND 
SOCIAL POLICY, edited by Peter Sutfeld and Philip Tetlock (NY Hemisphere, 1992) at 232.  See also p. 234 
asserting  "Furthermore, the fact that national patterns show little violent crime where guns are most dense implies 
that guns do not elicit aggression in any meaningful way. Quite the contrary, these findings suggest that high 
saturations of guns in places, or something correlated with that condition, inhibit illegal aggression."    
 Approaching the matter from a different direction, from the earliest data (19th Century on) the American 
jurisdictions with the most stringent gun controls are in general precisely the ones with the highest murder rates. 
Conversely, American states with homicide rates as low as Western Europe’s have high gun ownership, and no 
controls designed to deny guns to law abiding, responsible adults. Many possible reasons may be offered for these 
two facts. But however they are to be explained, they do not suggest that gun control reduces murder. 
For examination of a wide variety of studies concluding that none support the violence reductive efficacy of gun 
controls see James B. Jacobs, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK ch. 7 (Oxford, Oxford U. Press, 2002), John R. Lott, 
MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAW (Chicago, U. Chi. Press, 
1998), Gary Kleck, TARGETING GUNS:  FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL ch. 11 (1997), Matthew DeZee, 
"Gun Control Legislation: Impact and Ideology", 5 LAW & POLICY Q. 367 (1983); James D. Wright, Peter Rossi, 
Kathleen Daly, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, ch. 13 
(N.Y., Aldine: 1983). 
 12 Gary Kleck, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 22-23 (1997), and see the 
preceding pages for detailed analyses of the various data. 
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accurate for murder in Europe was at an all-time low before the gun controls were introduced.13 
For instance, the only English gun control during the 19th and early 20th Centuries was that police 
were to patrol without guns. During this period gun control prevailed far less in England or 
Europe than in certain American states which nevertheless had – and continue to have – murder 
rates that were and are very high comparatively.14 
In this connection two recent studies are pertinent. In 2004 the U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences released its evaluation from an review of 253 journal articles, 99 books, 43 government 
publications and some empirical research of its own. It could not identify any gun control that had 
reduced violent crime, suicide or gun accidents.15 The same conclusion was reached in a 2003 
study by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control’s review of then-extant studies16 (The CDC is 
vehemently anti-gun and deemed its results to show not that the more guns = more death mantra 
is erroneous but only that the scores of studies it reviewed were inconclusively done.) 
 Stringent gun controls were not adopted in England and Western Europe until after WWI. 
 
13 Barnett & Kates, supra. 
 14 In the period 1900-35 Arkansas, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, North and , South Carolina 
and Hawaii adopted laws variously requiring a license to own a handgun or to buy one, or banning handgun 
purchase altogether.  And “Saturday Night Special”-type bans existed in Tennessee, Arkansas, Virginia and various 
other Southern states. "Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States" in Don B.. Kates (ed.), 
RESTRICTING HANDGUNS.  
 15 Charles F. Wellford, John V. Pepper, and Carol V. Petrie (eds.), FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A 
CRITICAL REVIEW (National Academy of Sciences, 2004). It is perhaps not amiss to note that the review panel, 
which was set up during the Clinton Administration, was almost entirely composed of scholars who, to the extent 
their views were publicly known before their appointments, favored gun control. 
 16 “First Reports Evaluating the Effectiveness of Strategies for Preventing Violence: Firearms Laws” (CDC, 
2003) <cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5214a2.htm>  
12 
Consistent with the outcomes of the American studies just mentioned, these strict controls did not 
stem the general trend of ever-growing violent crime throughout the  post-WWII industrialized 
world including the U.S. and Russia. Prof. Malcolm’s study of English gun law and violent crime 
summarizes that nation’s 19th and 20th Century experience as follows: 
The peacefulness England used to enjoy was not the result of strict gun laws. 
When it had no firearms restrictions [19th and early 20th Century] England had 
little violent crime, while the present extraordinarily stringent gun controls have 
not stopped the increase in violence or even the increase in armed violence.... 
Armed crime, never a problem in England, has now become one. Handguns are 
banned but the kingdom has millions of illegal firearms. Criminals have no trouble 
finding them and exhibit a new willingness to use them. In the decade after 1957 
the use of guns in serious crime increased a hundredfold.17 
In the late 1990s England moved from stringent controls to a complete ban on handguns 
and many types of long guns. Hundreds of thousands were confiscated from owners law abiding 
enough to turn them in. Without suggesting this caused violence, the bans' ineffectiveness was 
such that by year 2000  violent crime had so increased that England  had the developed world’s 
highest violent crime rate, far surpassing even the U.S.18 Today English news media headline 
 
17 Joyce Lee Malcolm, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE (Cambridge, Harvard, 
2002) at pp. 209 and 219. 
 18 John van Kesteren, et al., “Criminal Victimization in 17 Industrialised [sic] Countries: Key Findings from 
the 2000 International Crime Victimization Surveys” (Feb. 23, 2001) . The surveys involved were conducted under 
the auspices of the governments of each nation and the general supervision of the University of Leiden and the 
Dutch Ministry of Justice. 
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violence in terms redolent  of the doleful, melodramatic ones that for so long characterized 
American news reports.19 
The divergence between the U.S. and the British Commonwealth became especially 
pronounced during the 1980s and 1990s. During these two decades, while Britain and the 
Commonwealth were making lawful firearm ownership increasingly difficult, more than 25 states 
in the United States passed laws allowing responsible citizens to carry concealed handguns. There 
are now 40 states, including more than 60% of the population, where qualified citizens can get 
such a handgun permit20. As a result, the number of Americans who are allowed to carry 
 
19 S e.g.: “Violent Crime is Out of Control” July 21, 2005, http://uk.news.yahoo.com/050721/140/fntfz.html;  
NEWS TELEGRAPH, March 13, 2005 “‘We are Reeling with the Murders; We Are in a Crisis with Major Crime’” 
(quoting a police chief) [http://news. Telegraph.co.uk]; LONDON EVENING STANDARD, April 12, 2005 “Police 
fear gun crime explosion” [http://www.thisislondon.com/news/londonnews/articles/
17867375?source=Evening%20Standard]; BBC News: May 21, 2003, “Gun Crimes Growing ‘Like Cancer,’” as 
well as July 16, 2001 "Handgun Crime 'Up" Despite Ban;" July 12, 2002: "[PM Blair] Pledge[s] to Tackle Soaring 
Street Crime;   Nov. 7, 2002,  “Scottish Gun Crime Soaring;”; Jan. 12, 2003. See also: PUNCH, "Britain's Tough 
Gun Control Laws Termed Total Failure: Land of Hope and Gunrunning," May 3-16, 2000; NEW STATESMAN, 
"The British Become Trigger Happy, Nov. 5, 2001; and Reuters (London) Jan. 9, 2003: “Gun crime soars in 
Britain’”, and the following articles for the dates indicated  a) from the  LONDON TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000: "Killings 
Rise As 3 Million Illegal Guns Flood Britain.";  October 13, 2002: "Murder rate soars to highest for a century"; Jan. 
9, 2003: “Handgun Crime Rises by 46% [in 2002]; b) from the INDEPENDENT NEWS: January 15, 2002 "Police 
Move to Tackle Huge Rise in Gun Crime; 27 December 2002   “Firearms amnesty to tackle surge in gun crime” 
[http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/story.jsp?story=364549; c)  from the  LONDON TELEGRAPH: 25 August, 
1999: "[Home Secretary Jack] Straw Braced for 20% Increase in Crime Rate; 17 July 2001, “Gun crime rises despite 
Dunblane pistol ban”;  17 August 2001, “Gun killings double as police claim progress”;  3 January 2002, “Police 
fear crime explosion as school-age muggers graduate to guns”; Feb. 24, 2002, “Gun crime trebles as weapons and 
drugs flood British cities.” 
20 In March 2006, Kansas and Nebraska became the 39th and 40th states, respectively, to pass “shall issue” 
concealed carry legislation. In Kansas, the state legislature voted to overturn the Governor’s veto of the bipartisan 
14 
concealed handguns in shopping malls, on the street, and in their cars has grown to 3.5 million 
men and women21. Arguably, these new laws have contributed to the drop in homicide and violent 
crime rates. Based on 25 years of correlated statistics from all of the more than 3,000 American 
counties John Lott and David Mustard conclude that adoption of these statutes has so deterred 
criminals from confrontation crime as to cause murder and violent crime to fall faster in states 
that adopted this policy than in the states that did not.22 
As indicated in the preceding footnote, the notion that more guns reduce crime is highly 
controversial. What the controversy has obscured from view is the corrosive effect of the Lott and 
Mustard work on the faith that more guns = more murder. As of 2006, 40 states have adopted 
laws under which guns became vastly more available to law abiding, responsible adults, i.e., 3.5 
million Americans are legally entitled not just to keep guns in their homes but to carry concealed 
 
legislation. Carl Manning, “Update 2: Kansas House Overrides Veto of Gun Bill.” THE ASSOCIATED PRESS. 
http://www.forbes.com/technology/feeds/ap/2006/03/23/ap2618492.html. In Nebraska, the governor signed the bill 
as passed by the state legislature. O’Hanlon, Kevin, “Concealed-weapons bill adopted,” THE ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, JOURNAL STAR, Lincoln, Nebraska. Friday, March 31, 2006, 
http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2006/03/31/legislature/doc442c57ae8eb55289989057.txt 
21 See Don Kates, in Timothy Lytton, 2005, op cit, p.64. 
22 See John R. Lott Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 1-68 (1997); John Lott, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME. 2nd Ed. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000. Several critics have now replicated Lott’s work using additional or different data, 
additional control variables, or new or different statistical techniques they deem superior to those Lott used. 
Interestingly, the replications all confirm Lott’s general conclusions; some even find that Lott underestimated the 
crime-reductive effects of allowing good citizens to carry concealed guns. See the seven articles printed in the Oct. 
1991 issue of THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (v. 44); also Florenz Plassman & John Whitley, 
"Confirming ‘More Guns, Less Crime,’" STANFORD LAW REVIEW 55 (2003) 1313. For what it’s worth, Lott, in 
THE BIAS AGAINST GUNS. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003, reiterates, and extends his findings, is endorsed by 
three Nobel laureates.  
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handguns with them wherever they go. But this has not resulted in more murder or violent crime 
in these states. Rather adoption of these statutes has been followed by very significant reduction 
in murder and violence in those states. 
 It must be understood that to determine whether it was this expansion of gun availability 
that caused reductions in violent crime requires taking account of various other factors that might 
also be deemed to have contributed. For instance, one of Lott's major critics attributes much of the 
drop in violent crime from the 1990s on to the legalization of abortion in the 1970s which he 
argues resulted in the non-birth of vast numbers of children who would have been 
disproportionately involved in violent crime had they existed in the 1990s (the Donohue-Levitt 
thesis)23.
The Lott-Mustard studies apparently took no account of the Donohue-Levitt thesis. Lott and 
Mustard did take at least some account of two American phenomena which many people think 
might have been responsible for then 1990s crime reduction. The United States dramatically 
increased both its prison population and the number of executions. The prison population in the 
U.S. tripled during this time period, jumping from around 100 prisoners per 100,000 in the late 
1970s to over 300 per 100,000 people in the general population in the early 1990s24. In addition, 
executions in the United States soared from about 5 per year in the early 1980s to more than 27 
 
23 John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 Q. J. ECON. 
379, (2001). 
24 See Allen Beck and Paige Harrison, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1997, AND PRISONERS IN 2004, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/incrttab.htm 
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per year in the early 1990s25. None of these trends are reflected in Commonwealth countries.  
Whatever the reason, the upshot is that violent crime, and homicide in particular, have 
plummeted in the United States over the past 15 years.26 The fall in the American crime rate is 
even more impressive when compared with the rest of the world. In 18 of the 25 countries 
surveyed by the British Home Office, violent crime increased during the 1990s27. This contrast 
should provoke thinking people to wonder what happened in those nations adopting policies 
based on the belief that introducing more and more restrictive firearm laws would reduce criminal 
violence. Perhaps the United States is doing something right. Further research is required to 
identify more precisely which elements of their approach is the most important, or whether all 
three elements acting in concert with each other was necessary to reduce criminal violence. 
This article will examine a broad range of international data that bear on two distinct but 
interrelated questions: first, whether widespread firearm access is an important contributing factor 
in murder and/or suicide, and second, whether the introduction of laws that restrict general access 
to firearms has been successful in reducing violent crime, homicide or suicide. Our conclusion 
from the available data is that suicide, murder and violent crime rates are determined by basic 
social, economic and/or cultural factors with the availability of any particular one of the world’s 
 
25 See Thomas Bonczar and Tracy L. Snell, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2003, Bureau of Justice Statistics 
Bulletin, November 2004, NJC 206627. 
26 These trends are easily seen in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data on the website of the federal Bureau 
of Investigation (http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm). 
27 See G. Barclay, C. Tavare, and A. Siddique (2001). INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1999. Issue 6/01 (May). Digital document available from 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/. 
17 
myriad deadly instrument being irrelevant.28 
VIOLENCE: THE DECISIVENESS OF SOCIAL FACTORS 
 One reason the extent of gun ownership in a society does not spur the murder rate is that 
murderers are not spread evenly throughout the population. Analysis of perpetrator studies shows 
that violent criminals, (and this is especially true of murderers) “almost always have a long 
history of involvement in criminal behavior."29 So it would not appreciably raise violence if all 
law abiding, responsible people had firearms because they are not the ones who rape, rob or 
murder.30 By the same token violent crime would not fall if guns were totally banned to civilians. 
As the respective examples of Luxembourg and Russia suggest,31 the kinds of people who murder 
 
28 See Miron, supra: “What factors do explain cross-country differences in violence? One possible answer is 
that culture--history, social norms, and the like--makes attitudes toward both violence and gun control substantially 
different across countries, simultaneously explaining both the differences in violence rates and the differences in gun 
control laws. Culture is likely an important determinant of cross-country differences in violence, but explanations 
based on culture are difficult to examine empirically. An alternative possibility is that various economic and social 
factors, such as demographics, ethnic diversity, education, income, inequality, deterrence, and the like, all contribute 
to the differences in violence across countries. There is empirical support for many of these effects, but it is not clear 
why such factors would explain the large differences in violence between the United States and other rich countries, 
nor is it clear how these factors can explain the existing patterns of gun availability, gun control, and violence.” 44 J. 
LAW & ECON at 616.  
 Prof. Miron offers studies and evidence suggesting that violence is substantially heightened in nations 
which, like the U.S., seriously attempt to enforce bans on narcotics. 
 29 Delbert S. Elliott, "Life Threatening Violence is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on Prevention," 69 
COLO. L. REV. 1081-1098 at 1089 (1998), emphasis added. 
 30 See discussion under “Do Ordinary People Murder” infra. 
 31 See footnotes 3-8 and Table 1 supra. 
18 
will either find guns despite severe controls or will find other weapons with which to kill.  
 Startling as the foregoing may seem, it represents the cross-national norm, not some 
bizarre departure from it. If the mantra (more guns = more death/fewer guns = less death) were 
true should not broad based cross-national comparisons show that nations with higher gun 
ownership per capita consistently have more death? But nations with higher gun ownership rates 
do not have higher murder (or suicide) rates than do those with lower gun ownership. Indeed 
many high gun ownership nations have much lower murder rates. Consider the wide divergence 
in murder rates among Continental European nations with widely divergent gun ownership rates. 
(Actually, those nations with least gun ownership generally seem to have the highest murder 
rates.) 
 The non-correlation between gun ownership and murder is reinforced by examination of 
statistics from larger numbers of nations across the developed world. Comparison of “homicide 
and suicide mortality data for thirty-six nations (including the United States) for the period 1990-
1995" to gun ownership levels showed "no significant (at the 5% level) association between gun 
ownership and the total homicide rate."32 Consistent with this is a later European study of data 
from 21 nations in which  "no significant correlations [of gun ownership levels] with total suicide 
or homicide rates were found."33 
32 Gary Kleck, TARGETING GUNS, supra p. 254. Though we have quoted the finding as to murder rates, 
the study also found no correlation to suicide rates. 
 33 Quoted from the Abstract to Martin Killias, John van Kesteren & Martin Rindlisbacher, 2001: "Guns, 
Violent Crime, and Suicide in 21 Countries, "CANADIAN J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 43:429-448 (2001) It bears 
emphasis that the authors – who are deeply anti-gun – emphasize the "very strong correlations between the presence 
of guns in the home and suicide committed with a gun.” (our italics) –  as if there were some import to the death 
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ASKING THE WRONG QUESTION 
 However unintentionally, the irrelevance of focus on weaponry is highlighted by the most 
common theme in more  guns = more death arguments. Epitomizing this theme is a World Health 
Organization (WHO) report solemnly asserting, “The easy availability of firearms has been 
associated with higher firearm mortality rates.”34 The authors apparently assume that (for 
instance) if denied firearms potential suicides will decide to live rather than turning to knives, 
poisons, hanging, jumping from great heights or the numerous other available suicide 
mechanisms. The evidence, however, indicates that all that is accomplished by the removal of one 
particular means from people who are motivated to suicide by social, economic, cultural or other 
circumstances is their killing themselves by some other means.35 Thus it is not just the murder 
 
being by gun rather than by hanging, poison, etc., etc. See discussion in the next section of this article. 
 34 W.H.O., SMALL ARMS AND GLOBAL HEALTH, p. 11 (W.H.O., Geneva, 2001), emphasis added. 
This irrelevancy is endlessly repeated, e.g.:  Wendy Cukier, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Public Health 
Approach,” 9 BROWN J. WORLD AFFAIRS 261, 266, 267 (2002) (“Studies have shown that rates of small arms 
death are linked to small arms accessibility....In industrialized countries, studies have shown that accessibility is 
related to firearm death rates... Other studies have examined the rates of death from firearms across regions, cities, 
high income countries [etx]....” Our italics); the article “Confronting the Small Arms Pandemic” in the April 2002 
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL by the president of Physicians for Global Survival, Neil Arya; and .EG Krug, KE 
Powell and LL Dahlberg, "Firearm-Related Deaths in the United States and 35 Other High- and Upper-Miiddle-
Income Countries," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 1998;27:214-221 (discussed in the text 
infra). 
 35 See Jacobs, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK supra at 120 (“if the Brady Act did have the effect of 
modestly reducing firearms suicides ... this effect was completely offset by an increase of the same magnitude in 
non-firearm suicide” resulting in the same number of deaths). To the same effect, see  the studies collected and 
reviewed by Kleck in ch. 8 of his TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL (Aldine, 1997). 
Indeed – though without noting the significance -- eight pages earlier (p. 3) the WHO Report states that world-wide  
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rate in gun-less Russia that is four times higher than the American rate; the Russian suicide rate is 
also about four times higher than the American.36 
There is no social benefit in decreasing the availability of guns if the result is only to 
increase the use of other means of suicide and murder, resulting in more or less the same amount  
of death. Elementary as this point is, proponents of the more guns = more death mantra seem 
oblivious to it. One study solemnly asserts that Americans are more likely to be shot to death than 
people in  the world’s other 35 “richest  nations,”37 While this is literally true, it is irrelevant – 
except,  perhaps to people who are  neurotically terrified  not of  death per se but just by gunshot. 
A fact of greater concern to normal people – but which the study fails to mention -- is that per 
capita murder overall is only half as frequent in the U.S. as in several of those other wealthy 
nations where gun murder is rarer, but murder by strangling, stabbing and/or beating is much 
more frequent.38 
“firearms accounted for only one-fifth of all suicides, just ahead of poisoning... [self-] strangulation, [i.e. hanging] 
was the most frequently used method of suicide.”  
 36 In 1999, the latest year for which we have Russian data available, the American suicide rate was 10.7. 
while the Russian suicide rate was c. 41 per 100,000 people, Compare William A. Pridemore & Andrew L. Spivak, 
“Patterns of Suicide in Russia,” forthcoming in SUICIDE AND LIFE THREATENING BEHAVIOR (2003) to 
NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS v. 49 # 8, "Deaths: Final Data for 1999" (issued September 25, 2001) 
authors: Donna L. Hoyert, Elizabeth Arias, Betty L. Smith, Sherry L. Murphy & Kenneth D Kochanek.  
 37 Quoting the EG Krug, KE Powell and LL Dahlberg article supra. 
 38 The 36 countries which the authors chose to cover were those having highest GNP per capita income as 
listed in the World Bank's 1994 World Development Report. Resort to David C. Stolinsky, “America: The Most 
Violent Nation?,” 5 MEDICAL SENTINEL 199, 200 (2000) shows three of those nations, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Estonia, had about 100% higher overall murder rates than the U.S.  Readers may question the value of comparing the 
U.S. to those particular nations. So let us emphasize that it was Krug, et. al who chose to do so. All we have done is 
provide full murder rate information as opposed to the partial information provided by the authors. 
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 Of course it may be speculated that murder rates around the world be higher if guns were 
more available. But there is simply no evidence to support this. Like any speculation it is not 
subject to conclusive disproof. But it flies in the face of the European data in Table 1 and the 
studies across 36 and 21 nations already discussed. These show no correlation of high gun 
ownership nations having more murder per capita or lower gun ownership nations having less.39 
To reiterate, the determinants of murder and suicide are basic social, economic and 
cultural factors not the prevalence of some mere form of deadly mechanism. In this connection 
recall that the American jurisdictions which have the highest violent crime rates are precisely 
those with the most stringent gun controls.40 This correlation does not necessarily prove pro-gun 
advocates correct that gun controls actually encourage crime by depriving victims of the means of 
self-defense. The explanation of this correlation may be political rather than criminological: 
Jurisdictions afflicted with violent crime tend to severely restrict gun ownership. But this does not 
suppress the crime for banning guns can not alleviate the socio-cultural and/or economic factors 
that are the real determinants of violence and crime rates.  As a result areas with severe violence 
problems tend correlatively to have severe gun control, leading to the appearance that gun 
 
39 Kleck, TARGETING GUNS, supra p. 254; Killias, et al., CANADIAN J. OF CRIMINOLOGY supra. 
 40 See notes, sources, and material cited at notes 111- 113 and accompanying text infra.  For at least 30 years 
gun advocates have echoed in more or less identical terms one's observation that 20% of American homicide is 
concentrated in four cities having only 6% of the total population, but the nation's most restrictive gun laws. Neal 
Knox, Hearings on Crime before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94 Cong. 1st Sess., 
pt. 7, p. 2394. In Oct. 2000 the head of another gun group ridiculed a Handgun Control “scorecard” for its 
misleading attempts to inversely correlate violent crime rates to the extent of the various states’ gun controls. He 
points out that, in fact, the states with the most restrictive gun laws consistently have the highest murder rates while 
those with the least controls had the lowest homicide rates. Larry Pratt, “HCI’s Scorecard,” Oct., 2000 at 
http://gunowners.org/op0042.htm. 
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controls actually cause violence.41 
+++++++++++++++++++ 
Tables 1, 2 about here 
++++++++++++++++++ 
 
Once again, we are not arguing these Table 2 data show that gun control causes nations to have 
much higher murder rates than do neighboring nations that allow handguns. Rather, we are 
asserting a political causation for the observed correlation that nations with stringent gun controls 
tend to have much higher murder rates than nations that allow guns. That political causation is 
that nations which have violence problems tend to adopt severe gun controls but these do not 
reduce the violence for violence is determined by basic socio-cultural and economic factors which 
are not affected by simplistic focusing on the mere availability of one among numerous potential 
deadly weapons. 
 The point is exemplified by the conclusions of the premier study of English gun control. 
Done by a senior English police official as his thesis at the Cambridge University Institute of 
Criminology and later published as a book, it found (as of the early 1970s):  
Half a century of strict controls has ended, perversely, with a far greater use of 
[handguns] in crime than ever before. No matter how one approaches the figures 
 
41 It is noteworthy that the correlation more gun control/more crime seems to hold true in other nations, 
though much less strikingly than in the U.S.. Miron, 44 J. LAW & ECON at 628 supra. 
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one is forced to the rather startling conclusion that the use of firearms in crime was 
very much less [in England before 1920] when there were no controls of any sort 
and when anyone, convicted criminal or lunatic, could buy any type of firearm 
without restriction.42 
Of course Chief Superintendent Greenwood was not urging that the law allow lunatics and 
criminals to own guns. The point is that violence will be rare when the basic socio-cultural and 
economic determinants so dictate; and conversely, crime will rise in response to changes in those 
determinants -- without much regard to the mere availability of some particular weaponry or the 
severity of laws against it.  
 
DO ORDINARY PEOPLE MURDER? 
 The more guns = more death mantra seems plausible to the many people who think of 
murders as mostly involving ordinary people who kill because they have access to a firearm when 
they get angry. If that were true, murder might well increase where people have ready access to 
firearms. But we have already seen there is no such correlation. Nations and areas with more guns 
per capita do not have higher murder rates than those with less.43 
Nevertheless an oft-repeated litany holds: that a “gun in the closet to protect against 
burglars will most likely be used to shoot a spouse in a moment of rage....The problem is you and 
me -- law-abiding folks"; that banning handguns will “protect us against the most likely source of 
 
42 Colin Greenwood, FIREARMS CONTROL: ARMED CRIME AND FIREARMS CONTROL IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES 243 (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1972). 
 43 See Tables 1-3 and notes 1-5 supra and 95-97 infra. 
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handgun murder: ordinary citizens. 44; that “most gun-related homicides ... are the result of 
impulsive actions taken by individuals who have little or no criminal background and who are 
known to the victims”;45 that “the majority of homicide[s occur] ... not as a result of criminal 
activity, but because of arguments between people who know each other;” that each year there are 
thousands of gun murders “by law-abiding citizens who might have stayed law-abiding if they 
had not possessed firearms.”46 
These comments are truly remarkable in that they not only rest on no evidence whatever 
but fly in the face of facts that have so uniformly been established by homicide studies dating 
back to at least the 1890s as to have become "criminological axioms."47 Insofar as studies (of 
which those detailed below are but a representative sample) focus on perpetrators they show that 
neither a majority, nor many, nor virtually any murderers are ordinary “law abiding folks”, “law 
abiding citizens.” Rather, almost all murderers are extreme aberrants with life histories of 
violence, psychopathology, substance abuse and other dangerous behaviors. "The vast majority of 
 
44 The last two quotes come from, respectively David Kairys "A Carnage in the Name of Freedom", 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, September 12, 1988, and Nicholas Dixon, Why We Should Ban Handguns in the 
United States, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 243, 265-66 (1993) and are recycled in Frank J. Vandall  “A 
Preliminary Consideration of Issues Raised in the Firearms Sellers Immunity Bill,” A PRELIMINARY 
CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES RAISED IN THE FIREARMS SELLERS IMMUNITY BILL 38 AKRON L. 
REV. 113, 118-19  (2005) at footnotes 28 and 32. 
 45 Robert Spitzer, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL (Chatham, N.J., Chatham House 1995) 186, 
emphasis added. 
 46 The last two quotes given are from, respectively: the Violence Policy Center's blurb describing itself, 
"About the Violence Policy Center" and the National Coalition to Ban Handguns’ undated, unpaginated pamphlet 
entitled "A Shooting Gallery Called America" (emphasis in original). 
 47 David Kennedy & Anthony Braga,  "Homicide in Minneapolis: Research for Problem Solving,” 2 
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persons involved in life-threatening violence have a long criminal record with many prior contacts 
with the justice system."48 "Thus homicide – [whether] of a stranger or [of] someone known to the 
offender -- ‘is usually part of a pattern of violence, engaged in by people who are known ... as 
violence prone.’”49 Though only 15% of Americans have criminal records,50 roughly 90 percent 
of adult murderers have adult records, with an average adult career of six or more years, including 
four major felonies.51 These national data dovetail with data from local 19th and 20th Century 
studies. For example: “Victims as well as offenders [in 1950s and 1960s Philadelphia murders] 
finally, tended to be people with prior police records, usually for violent crimes such as assault, 
and both had typically been drinking at the time of the fatal encounter."52 "The great majority of 
both perpetrators and victims of [1970s Harlem] assaults and murders had previous [adult] arrests, 
probably over 80% or more;”53 1990s Boston police and probation officers agreed that virtually 
all juveniles who murder are gang members, though the killing is not necessarily gang-directed, 
e.g. a gang member who stabs his girlfriend to death in a fit or anger;54 Regardless of their arrests 
 
HOMICIDE STUDIES 263-290 (1998). 
 48 Delbert S. Elliott, "Life Threatening Violence is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on Prevention," 69 
COLO. L. REV. 1081-1098 at 1093 (1998), collecting studies. 
 49 Gerald D. Robin, VIOLENT CRIME AND GUN CONTROL (Cincinnati, Academy of Criminal Justice 
Sciences: 1991) at p. 47. 
 50 Mark Cooney, "The Decline of Elite Homicide," 35 CRIMINOLOGY 381, 386 (1997). 
 51 Gary Kleck & Don B. Kates, ARMED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GUN CONTROL 20-21 (Prometheus 
2001). 
 52 Roger Lane, MURDER IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (Ohio U. Press, 1997) p. 259 
 53 A. Swersey and E. Enloe, HOMICIDE IN HARLEM (N.Y., Rand, 1975) 17. 
 54 Anthony Braga, Anne M. Piehl & David M. Kennedy, "Youth Homicide in Boston: An Assessment of the 
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for other crimes, 80% of 1997 Atlanta murder arrestees had at least one prior drug offense with 
70% having 3 or more prior drug offenses.55 
Several of the more recent homicide studies just reviewed were done by the Kennedy 
School at Harvard whose latest study found almost all arrested murderers to have prior arrests 
with many being known to police as gang members.56 
That murderers are not ordinary, law abiding responsible adults is further documented in 
other sources. Psychological studies of juvenile murderers variously find 80-100% to be psychotic 
or have psychotic symptoms.57 Only 75% of Massachusetts domestic murderers in the years 
1991-95 "had a prior [adult] criminal history," but 23.6% "were under an active restraining order 
at the time of the homicide. Forty percent of perpetrators had a history of having been under a 
restraining order at some time prior to the homicide, taken out by the victim or some other 
person."58 
Supplementary Homicide Report Data," 3 HOMICIDE STUDIES 277, 283-84 (1999) 
 55 Dean G. Rojek, "The Homicide and Drug Connection", p. 135 in Paul H. Blackman, et al, THE 
VARIETIES OF HOMICIDE AND ITS RESEARCH (Quantico, VA, F.B.I. Academy, 2000). 
 56 “Some 95% of homicide offenders, 82% of aggravated gun assault offenders, 47% of homicide victims, 
and 29% of aggravated gun assault victims were arraigned at least once in Massachusetts courts before they 
committed their crime or were victimized. Individuals that were previously known to the criminal justice system 
were involved in a wide variety of offenses and, on average, committed many prior crimes... On average, aggravated 
gun assault offenders had been arraigned for 12 prior offenses, homicide offenders had been arraigned for 9 prior 
offenses....” Anthony A. Braga, Jack McDevitt, & Glenn L. Pierce, “Understanding and Preventing Gang Violence: 
Problem Analysis and Response Development in Lowell, MA,” [to be published in POLICE QUARTERLY (2005, 
Volume 8, Number 3, specific page numbers unknown)]   
 57 Wade C. Myers & Kerrilyn Scott, "Psychotic and Conduct Disorder Symptoms in Juvenile Murderers," 2 
HOMICIDE STUDIES 160, 161-63 (1998). 
 58 Linda Langford, Nancy Isaac & Sandra Adams, "Criminal and Restraining Order Histories of Intimate 
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 This last study is one of many exposing the false concept that many murders involve 
ordinary people killing spouses in a moment of rage. While there are many domestic homicides, 
such murders do not occur in ordinary families nor are the murderers ordinary, law-abiding 
adults. “The day-to-day reality is that most family murders are preceded by a long history of 
assaults” by the perpetrator (the man) upon his mate.59 One study of such murders found "A 
history of domestic violence was present in 95.8%" of cases.60 Quotations like the following are a 
routine feature of domestic homicide studies: 
The overriding theme to emerge from these cases was that [domestic] partner 
homicide is most often the final outcome of chronic women battering.61 
[Citing studies from Detroit and Kansas City,] 90% of all the family homicides 
were preceded by previous disturbances at the same address, with a median of 5 
calls per address.62 
This study reemphasizes the central role of domestic violence as an antecedent to 
partner femicide.63 
Partner-Related Homicide Offenders in Massachusetts, 1991-95" in Blackman, VARIEIES OF HOMICIDE, supra. 
 59 See Murray A. Straus, "Domestic Violence and Homicide Antecedents", 62 BULLETIN OF THE N.Y. 
ACADEMY OF MEDICINE 446, 454, 457 (1986) and "Medical Care Costs of Intrafamily Assault and Homicide", 
62 N.Y. ACAD. OF MED. 556, 557 fn. (1986). 
 60 Paige Hall-Smith, Kathryn E. Moracco & John D. Butts, "Partner Homicide in Context," 2 HOMICIDE 
STUDIES 400, 410 (1998). The 95.8 is the percentage of murders in the study as to which sufficient information 
was available on the background of the parties. 
 61 Hall-Smith, et al., supra at 411. 
 62 Robin, supra, at 47.  
 63 Kathryn E. Moracco, Carol W. Runyan, & John D. Butts, "Femicide in North Carolina, 1991-1993,” pp. 
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 The only kind of evidence cited to support the mythology that most murderers are 
ordinary people is that many murders arise from arguments and/or occur in homes and between 
acquaintances.64 Those citing these bare facts as if they were relevant seem to be laboring under 
the unexamined assumption that criminals don't have acquaintances or homes or arguments – so if 
most murders involve these things, the perpetrators must be non-criminals. Of the many studies 
belying this, the broadest analyzed a year’s national data on gun murders occurring in homes and 
between acquaintances. It found "the most common victim-offender relationship" was "where 
both parties knew one another because of prior illegal transactions."65 
Thus the term "acquaintance homicide" does not refer to murders between ordinary 
acquaintances. Rather it refers to, for example: drug dealers being killed by competitors or 
customers; gang members being killed by members of the same or rival gangs; and women being 
killed by stalkers or abusers who have brutalized them on previous occasions. Federal and state 
laws already prohibit guns to most such aberrants.66 
422-446. 
 64 See, e.g., Spitzer and Kairys, supra and Adler et al., Correspondence, 272 JAMA 1409 (1994), responding 
to criticism on this point of their article Karl P. Adler & J.A. Barondess, et al. "Firearms Violence and Public Health: 
Limiting the Availability of Guns", 271 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 1281 
(1994). 
 65 Gary Kleck, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 236 (1997) (emphasis added) 
analysis of U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics data on murder defendants being prosecuted in the 33 largest U.S. urban 
counties. 
 66 Current federal law prohibits gun possession by minors, persons previously convicted of domestic 
violence misdemeanors, or of any felony, or who have been involuntarily committed to mental institutions or by 
drug addicts. 18 U.S.C. sec. 921ff.; as to state gun laws see, e.g., Cal. Penal C. §§ 12021ff., 12072, 12076, 12100-1, 
12551-2 and W & I. C. §§ 8100-8105. For a summary of the general patterns of federal and state guns laws see CAN 
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 Obviously there are certain people who should not be allowed to own any instrument more 
deadly than a toothpick. Reasonable as such prohibitions are, it is unrealistic to think those people 
will comply any more readily than they do with laws against violent crime.67 In any event, there is 
no reason for laws against gun possession by ordinary, law abiding responsible adults since they 
virtually never murder. Since such adults are far more likely to be victims of violent crime than to 
commit it, disarming them is not just unproductive but counter-productive.68 
GUN CONTROL WORK, supra, ch. 2. 
 67"… there is no good reason to suppose that people intent on arming themselves for criminal purposes 
would not be able to do so even if the general availability of firearms to the larger population were seriously 
restricted. Here it may be appropriate to recall the First Law of Economics, a law whose operation has been sharply 
in evidence in the case of Prohibition, marijuana and other drugs, prostitution, pornography, and a host of other 
banned articles and substances, namely, that demand creates its own supply. There is no evidence anywhere to show 
that reducing the availability of firearms in general likewise reduces their availability to persons with criminal intent 
or that persons with criminal intent would not be able to arm themselves under any set of general restrictions on 
firearms." UNDER THE GUN, supra at 137-38; italics in original. 
 68 This article will not discuss the defensive use of firearms beyond making the following observations: 
While there is great controversy about that subject, it is a misleading controversy in which anti-gun advocates' deep 
ethical or moral objections to civilian self-defense are presented in the guise of empirical argument. The empirical 
evidence unquestionably establishes that gun ownership by prospective victims both allows them to resist criminal 
attack and deters violent criminals from attacking in the first place. See the results of U.S. Justice Department-
funded surveys among large numbers of incarcerated adult and juvenile felons in James D. Wright & Peter Rossi, 
ARMED AND DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 154 (1986) and Joseph F. 
Sheley & James D. Wright, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: YOUTH, GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN URBAN AMERICA 
63 (Aldine, 1995), as well as the evidence reported in, for instance, Lawrence Southwick, "Self-Defense with Guns: 
The Consequences," 28 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 351-370 (2000) David B. Kopel, "Lawyers, Guns and Burglars," 43 
ARIZONA LAW REV. 346-367 (2001) and John R. Lott, THE BIAS AGAINST GUNS (2003).  
 The legitimate question is not whether victim gun possession allows for self-defense and deters criminal 
violence, but how extensive and important these benefits are. Compare Kleck & Kates, supra, chs. 6 and 7, Philip J. 
Cook & Jens Ludwig, GUNS IN AMERICA (1997), Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, "Defensive Gun Use: New 
Evidence from a National Survey," 14 J. QUANT. CRIMIN. 111 (1998), Lott, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME, supra, 
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MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME? 
Anti-gun activists are not alone in their faith that widespread firearm ownership 
substantially affects violent crime rates. The same belief also characterizes many pro-gun 
activists. Of course their faith leads them to the opposite conclusion, i.e., that widespread firearm 
ownership reduces violence by deterring criminals into non-confrontation crimes such as theft 
from unoccupied commercial or residential premises. Superficially, the evidence for this 
deterrence belief seems persuasive. Table 1, for instance, shows that Denmark has roughly half 
the gun ownership rate of neighboring (across the Baltic) Norway, but a one third higher murder 
rate; and Russia, another neighbor of Norway, has only one ninth Norway’s gun ownership rate 
but a 900% higher murder rate. Looking at tables 1-3 it is easy to find nations in which very high 
gun ownership rates correlate with very low murder rates while other nations with very low gun 
ownership rates have much higher murder rates. And in various nations discussed in this article 
drastic reductions in gun ownership among the law-abiding populace have coincided with 
substantial increases in murder or violent crime in general. 
Moreover there is not insubstantial evidence that in the United States widespread gun 
availability has helped reduce murder and other violent crime rates. But on closer analysis this 
evidence is uniquely applicable to the U.S., and inapplicable to other nations.  
More than 100 million handguns are owned in the U.S.69, primarily for self-defense70 – 
 
and Marvin E. Wolfgang, "A Tribute to a View I Have Opposed", 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL, 188 (1995). 
69 See figures given at p. 63 of Don B. Kates, "The Limits of Gun Control: A Criminological Perspective" in 
Timothy Lytton, ed., SUING THE FIREARMS INDUSTRY: A LEGAL BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF 
GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2005). 
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and 3.5 million people have permits to carry concealed handguns for protection71. The latest 
analysis reveals "a great deal of self-defensive gun use" in the U.S., "in fact, more defensive gun 
uses [by victims] than crimes committed with firearms72." It is little wonder that National Institute 
of Justice surveys among prison inmates find large percentages saying fear that a victim might be 
armed deterred them from confrontation crimes. ‘[T]he felons most frightened "about confronting 
an armed victim" were those from states with the greatest relative number of privately owned 
firearms.’ Conversely, robbery is highest in states that most restrict gun ownership."73 
Concomitantly a series of studies by John Lott and his co-author David Mustard conclude 
that the issuance of millions of permits to carry concealed handguns are associated with drastic 
declines American homicide rates74.
Ironically, to detail the American evidence for the deterrent value of widespread defensive 
gun ownership is also to raise questions as to how applicable that evidence would be to even those 
other nations that have widespread gun ownership but low violence. There are no data for foreign 
nations comparable to the U.S. data just discussed. Without such data are we to believe millions 
 
70 Gary Kleck, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 74 (1997) collecting survey 
responses. 
71 Kates, supra, at p. 65. 
72 James B. Jacobs, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK 14 (Oxford, Oxford U. Press, 2002), collecting studies. 
73 Kates supra at p. 70 collecting studies. 
74 John R. Lott Jr. & David B. Mustard, “Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns,” 26 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 1-68 (1997), John R. Lott Jr., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: 
UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAW (U. Chicago Press, 1998), David B. Mustard, "Culture 
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of Norwegians own handguns and carry them for protection, wherefore Norwegian criminals are 
deterred from committing violent crimes? Or that guns are commonly kept for defense in German 
homes and stores so German criminals are afraid to rob them? On the contrary it seems unlikely 
that guns are commonly owned for protection in nations whose violence rates are so low. 
Moreover, if the deterrent effect of gun ownership accounts for low violence rates in high 
gun ownership nations other than the U.S., one has to wonder why that deterrent effect is so much 
greater there. Even with the drop in U.S. murder rates which Lott and Mustard attribute to the 
massive increase in gun carry licensing, the U.S. murder rate is still eight times higher than 
Norway’s – despite the fact that the U.S. has an almost 300% higher rate of gun ownership. That 
is consistent with the points made above: Murder rates are determined by socio-economic and 
cultural factors. In the U.S. those factors include that the number of civilian-owned guns nearly 
equals the population – triple the ownership rate in even the highest European gun-ownership 
nations – and, that vast numbers of guns are kept for personal defense. That is not a factor in other 
nations with comparatively high firearm ownership. High gun ownership may well be a factor in 
the recent drastic decline in American homicide. But even so American homicide is driven by 
socio-economic and cultural factors which keep it far higher than in most European nations. 
In sum, though many nations with widespread gun ownership have much lower murder 
rates than nations that severely restrict gun ownership, it would be simplistic to assume that at all 
times and in all places widespread gun ownership depresses violence by deterring many criminals 
into non-confrontation crime. There is evidence that it does so in the U.S. where defensive gun 
 
Affects Our Beliefs About Firearms, But Data Are Also Important," 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1387 (2003). These 
studies are highly controversial. See Kates, supra, 70-71 for discussion of critics and criticisms. 
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ownership is a substantial socio-cultural phenomenon. But the more plausible explanation for 
many nations having widespread gun ownership with low violence is that these nations never had 
high murder and violence rates and so never had occasion to enact severe anti-gun laws. On the 
other hand in nations that have experienced high and rising violent crime rates, the legislative 
reaction has generally been to enact increasingly severe anti-gun laws. This is futile for reducing 
gun ownership by the law-abiding citizenry – the only ones who obey gun laws – does not reduce 
violence or murder. The result is that high crime nations that ban guns to reduce crime end up 
having both high crime and stringent gun laws, while low crime nations which do not much 
restrict guns continue to have low violence rates. 
Thus we believe that both sides of the gun prohibition debate are wrong in seeing the 
availability of guns as a major determinative factor in the incidence of murder in any particular 
society. We recognize, however, that many people believe that gun availability has great 
importance in explaining homicide rates. To those who prefer that belief we offer an admonition 
based on the historical, geographic, and demographic evidence explored in this article. Whether 
gun availability be viewed as a cause or as a mere coincidence, the long term macrocosmic 
evidence is that gun ownership spread widely throughout societies consistently correlates with 
stable or declining murder rates. This pattern simply cannot be squared with the mantra that more 
guns = more death and fewer guns = less. Whether causative or not, the consistent international 
pattern is that more guns = less murder and other violent crime. We now proceed to further 
examine that consistent international pattern. Even if one is inclined to think that gun availability 
is an important factor the available international data cannot be squared with the mantra that more 
guns = more death and fewer guns = less. Rather, if firearms availability does matter, the data 
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consistently show that the way it matters is that more guns = less violent crime. 
GEOGRAPHIC, HISTORICAL AND  
DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS 
 If more guns = more death and fewer guns = less death it should follow, ceteris paribus: a) 
that geographic areas with higher gun ownership should have more murder than those with less 
gun ownership; b) that demographic groups with higher gun ownership should be more prone to 
murder than those with less  ownership; and c) that historical eras in which gun ownership is 
widespread should have more murder than those in which guns were fewer or less widespread. As 
discussed infra, these effects which should follow – if more guns really do mean more death – do 
not follow. Historical eras, demographic groups and geographic areas with more guns do not have 
more murder than those with fewer. Indeed, those with more guns often or even generally, have 
less murder. 
 Of course, all other things may not be equal. Obviously, many factors other than guns may 
promote or reduce the numbers of murders in any given place or time, or among particular 
groups. And it may be impossible even to identify these factors, much less to take account of 
them all. Thus any conclusion to be drawn from the kinds of evidence that are presented infra 
must necessarily be tentative.  
 Acknowledging this does not, however, blunt the force of two crucial things. The first is 
the burden of proof. Those who assert the mantra, and urge that public policy be based on it, bear 
the burden of proving that more guns do = more death and fewer guns = less death. But they 
cannot bear that burden because there simply are no large number of cases in which the 
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prevalence of guns among the general population has led to more murder. By the same token, but 
even more important, it cannot be shown that in many cases a reduction in the number of guns 
available to the general population has led to less death. Nor is the burden borne by speculating 
that the reason such cases do not appear is that other factor(s) always intervene so it turns out that 
more guns don’t mean more death and/or that fewer do not mean less death. 
 Allied to the burden of proof issue is that of plausibility. On their face the following facts 
from Table 2 supra suggest that gun ownership is irrelevant, or has little relevance, to murder: 
France and neighboring Germany have exactly the same (comparatively high) rate of gun 
ownership, yet the French murder rate is nearly twice the German; France has infinitely more gun 
ownership than Luxembourg which nevertheless has a five times higher murder rate though 
handguns are illegal and other kinds of guns sparse; Germany has almost double the gun 
ownership rate of neighboring Austria, yet much  the same (very low) murder rate; the Norwegian 
gun ownership rate is over twice the Austrian yet the murder rates are almost identical.  
 And then there is Table 3 which shows, inter alia: Slovenia with 40% more gun 
ownership than Slovakia nevertheless has roughly 1/3rd less murder per capita; Hungary has more 
than six and half times the gun ownership rate of neighboring Roumania but a substantially lower 
murder rate; the Czech Republic’s gun ownership rate is more than 3 times that of neighboring 
Poland but its murder rate is lower; Poland and neighboring Slovenia have exactly the same 
murder rate though Slovenia has over three times more gun ownership per capita. 
 
++++++++++++++++++++ 
Table 3 about here 
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 On their face Tables 2 and 3, and the comparisons gleaned from them suggest that gun 
ownership is irrelevant, or has little relevance, to murder. So, as will be seen, do the historical and 
demographic comparisons discussed infra. Again, all these data may be misleading. It is 
conceivable that more guns do = more murder, but that this causation does not appear because 
some unidentifiable extraneous factor(s) always intervene so that   geographic areas, demographic 
groups and historical eras with more guns nevertheless have no more murder than those with 
fewer guns. That is conceivable, but is it likely? In the words of, Hans Toch, a senior American 
criminologist who 35 years ago endorsed handgun prohibition and confiscation, but then recanted 
based on later research:  "It is hard to explain that where firearms are most dense, violent crime 
rates are lowest, and where guns are least dense violent crime rates are highest.”75 
Prof. Toch had been a consultant to the 1960s Eisenhower Commission, and until the 
1990s had endorsed its conclusions that widespread handgun ownership causes violence, and that 
reducing it would reduce violence. Franklin Zimring, one of the architects of those conclusions, 
has admitted that they were made speculatively, and essentially without empirical basis.76As to 
the findings of the subsequent  corpus of research, Toch has written: 
 
75 Quoting from HansToch & Alan Lizotte, "Research and Policy: The Case of Gun Control" in 
PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY, edited by Peter Sutfeld and Philip Tetlock (NY Hemisphere, 1992). 
 76 Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 32 (1987):  "In 
the 1960s after the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King and Senator Robert F. 
Kennedy, it [gun control] became a major subject of public passion and controversy, [sparking a debate that] has 
been heated, acrimonious and polarized... It began in a factual vacuum [in which] neither side felt any great need for 
factual support to buttress foregone conclusions. In the 1960s, there was literally no scholarship on the relationship 
between guns and the incidence or consequences of interpersonal violence and no work in progress." Emphasis 
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[W]hen used for protection firearms can seriously inhibit aggression and can 
provide a psychological buffer against the fear of crime. Furthermore, the fact that 
national patterns show little violent crime where guns are most dense implies that 
guns do not elicit aggression in any meaningful way. Quite the contrary, these 
findings suggest that high saturations of guns in places, or something correlated 
with that condition, inhibit illegal aggression.77 
1. DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS 
Contrary to what should be the case if more guns = more death, there are no “consistent 
indications of a link between gun ownership and criminal or violent behavior by owners”; in fact, 
gun ownership is “higher among whites than among blacks, higher among middle-aged people 
than among young people, higher among married than among unmarried people, higher among 
richer people than poor” – these all being “patterns that are the reverse of the way in which 
criminal behavior is distributed.78”
These conclusions are reinforced by focus on patterns of Afro-American homicide. Per 
capita, Afro-American murder rates are much higher than white.79 If more guns = more death, and 
fewer guns = less, one might assume gun ownership is higher among Afro-Americans than among 
 
added. 
 77 Toch & Lizotte, supra, at pp. 232, 234. 
78 Kleck, TARGETING GUNS, p. 71 
 79 Malcolm, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE, supra, 232-33, Alfred Blumstein, 
"Youth Violence, Guns and the Illicit-Drug Industry," 86 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOL. 10, 21 (1995). 
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whites. But, no, Afro-American gun ownership is markedly lower than white.80 
Particularly corrosive to the mantra is the major exception to the fact that Afro-Americans 
have lower gun ownership: per capita: Rural Afro-Americans are much, much more likely to have 
firearms, than are urban Afro-Americans.81 Yet, despite their generally much greater access to 
guns, the murder rate of young rural black males is a small fraction of the murder rate of young 
urban black males.82 
These facts are only anomalous in relation to the mantra more guns = more death/fewer 
guns = less. In contrast, these facts accord with, indeed exemplify, the point of our earlier 
discussion of the aberrance of murderers: Whatever their race, ordinary people simply do not 
murder. So it does nothing at all to reduce murder that law abiding, responsible Afro-Americans 
have fewer guns -- because they aren’t the ones who are killing. The killers are a small minority 
of extreme anti-social aberrants who manage to get guns whatever the level of gun ownership 
in the black community generally.
Indeed, murderers generally fall into a group some criminologists have called “violent 
predators,” sharply differentiating them not only from the overall population but from other 
criminals as well. Surveys among imprisoned felons indicate that while on the outside the 
ordinary felon averages perhaps 12 crimes per year. In contrast, “violent predator”-type felons 
 
80 "... white gun ownership exceed[ed] that for blacks by about 40 percent in 1996...." John R. Lott, MORE 
GUNS, LESS CRIME 39 (Chicago, U. of Chicago: 2000). See generally Kleck, TARGETING GUNS, supra, p. 71.  
 81 Id. 
 82 The murder rate of young urban Afro-Americans is roughly 1,000% higher than that of their rural 
counterparts. See Lois A. Fingerhut, et al., "Firearm and Non Firearm Homicide Among Persons 15 Through 19 
Years of Age," JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 267 (1992): 3048 at 3049, table 1 
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spend much or most of their time committing crimes, averaging 8 assaults, 63 robberies, 172 
burglaries, and 214 other thefts annually.83 A National Institute of Justice survey among 2,000 
felons in ten state prisons which focused on gun crime said of these types of respondents:  
...the men we have labeled Predators were clearly omnibus felons ... committ[ing] 
more or less any crime they had the opportunity to commit... [¶] The Predators 
(handgun and shotgun combined) amounted to about 21% of the sample and yet 
accounted for 51% of the total crimes [admitted by the 2,000 felons]... Thus when 
we talk about controlling crime in the United States today, we are talking largely 
about controlling the behavior of these men.84 
The point here is not just that demographic patterns of homicide and gun ownership in the 
Afro-American community do not support the more guns = more death mantra.  More important 
yet is those patterns’ refutation of fewer guns = less death. The fact of fewer guns among ordinary 
Afro-Americans does not lead to fewer murders for it does not mean fewer guns for the aberrant 
minority who murder. The correlation of very high murder rates with low gun ownership in Afro-
American communities in general simply does not bear out the notion that disarming the populace 
as a whole will disarm, and prevent murder by, the potential murderers, 
 
2. MACRO-HISTORICAL EVIDENCE: From Medieval Times to the 20th Century. 
Notoriously, the Dark Ages were a time of brutal and endemic warfare. They also 
experienced rates of ordinary murder about double those of the U.S. at its worst. But Dark Age 
 
83 Jan M. Chaiken & Marcia R. Chaiken, VARIETIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (Rand, 1982). 
 84 ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS, supra. 76. 
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homicide "cannot be explained in terms of the availability of firearms, which had not yet been 
invented."85 But that invention itself provides some test of the mantra. If it were true that more 
guns = more murder/fewer guns = less death, murder should have risen with the invention of 
firearms and their becoming ever more efficient and more widely distributed among the 
population.  
 Yet murder rates seem to have fallen sharply as guns became more efficient and widely 
owned in England, much of Europe and Scandinavia over the five centuries after the invention of 
firearms86 During much of this period, incidentally, because the entire adult male population of 
England was deemed to constitute a militia, every military age male was required to possess arms 
and appear with them when called out for militia training and actual service.87 
The same was true in America during the period of colonial and post-colonial settlement. 
Indeed the basic English militia laws were superceded by the colonies’ even more specific and 
demanding legal requirements of universal gun ownership. Under those laws virtually all 
colonists, and every home, had to have guns. By law, male youths were deemed of military age at 
16, 17 or 18 (depending on the colony) and every military age man, excepting the insane, infirm, 
and criminals, had to have arms; and they were subject to being called for inspection, militia drill 
or service bringing their legally required guns. To arm those too poor to afford guns, the laws 
 
85 Lane, supra, MURDER IN AMERICA p. 15 and ch. 1 generally. 
 86 Ibid., p. 20, Malcolm, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE, supra, pp. 19-20. 
 87 See generally Joyce Lee Malcolm, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT ch. 1 (Cambridge, Harvard, 1994), Stephen P. Halbrook, "THAT EVERY MAN BE 
ARMED": THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT ch. 2 (Albuquerque, U. Of N.M. Press: 1984) 
and Don B. Kates, "Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment", 82 MICH. L. REV. 
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required that guns be purchased for them and that they would have to make installment payments 
to pay back the cost.88 
It bears emphasis that these gun ownership requirements were not limited to those subject 
to militia service. Women, seamen, clergy, and some public officials were automatically exempt 
from militia call up, as were men over the upper military age which varied from 45 to 60, 
depending on the colony. But, as a deterrent to criminal and other attack, every household was 
 
203, 214-215 (1983) (hereinafter cited as “Original Meaning”). 
 88 Malcolm, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra at 138-140, Original Meaning, supra, 82 MICH L. REV. 
supra, 214-216.   Typical laws (quoted with original spelling and punctuation) appear from the following sources: 
William Hand Browne, ed., ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1885) 1:77 
(“that every house keeper or housekeepers within this Province shall have ready continually upon all occasions 
within his her or their house for him or themselves and for every person within his her or their house able to bear 
armes one Serviceable fixed gunne of bastard muskett boare¼” along with a pound of gunpowder, four pounds of 
pistol or musket shot, “match for matchlocks and of flints for firelocks¼.”);  August 2, 1619, “Proceedings of the 
Virginia Assembly, 1619,” in Lyon Gardiner Tyler, NARRATIVES OF EARLY VIRGINIA, 1606-1625 (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1907; reprinted New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959), 273. (requiring that everyone attend church 
on Sunday, further providing that “all such as bear arms [i.e., all able-bodied males aged 16 and above] shall bring their 
pieces, swords, powder and shot” with them to church on penalty of a fine.);  Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, RECORDS OF 
THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND (Boston: William 
White, 1853) 1:83 (requiring that everyone, including servants, was to be armed -- with anyone unable to afford a gun to 
be armed by the town, which the recipients were to reimburse "when they shal be able.");  John Russell Bartlett, ed., 
RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, IN NEW ENGLAND 
(Providence, R.I.: A. Crawford Greene and Brother, 1856), 1:79-80 and 1:94 (requiring, respectively:: “that every man 
do come armed unto the meeting upon every sixth day,” and also that militia officers go “to every inhabitant [in 
Portsmouth and] see whether every one of them has powder” and bullets; and “that noe man shall go two miles from the 
Towne unarmed, eyther with Gunn or Sword; and that none shall come to any public Meeting without his weapon.”); 
CODE OF 1650, BEING A COMPILATION OF THE EARLIEST LAWS AND ORDERS OF THE GENERAL 
COURT OF CONNECTICUT (Hartford, Conn.: Silas Andrus, 1822), 72-73 (“That all persons that are above the age of 
sixteene yeares, except magistrates and church officers, shall beare arms...; and every male person with this jurisdiction, 
above the said age, shall have in continuall readines, a good muskitt or other gunn, fitt for service, and allowed by the 
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required to have a gun, even if its occupants were all female, under or overage males, seamen, 
clergymen and/or public officials. Likewise, all respectable men were theoretically required to 
carry arms when out and abroad.89 
These laws may have been less fully enforced  (except in times of danger) in areas that 
had been long settled and peaceful. Nevertheless  "by the eighteenth century colonial Americans 
were the most heavily armed people in the world.”90 Yet, far from more guns meaning more 
death, murders were "rare" and "few" involved guns "despite their wide availability."91 
America remained very well armed, yet homicide remained quite low, for over two 
hundred years from the earliest settlements through the entire colonial and early Republic periods. 
 
clark of the band.¼”  ).  





 90 John M. Dederer, WAR IN AMERICA TO 1775 (N.Y., 1990) 116. N.B.: It should be noted that the 
foregoing facts are contradictory to assertions made in Michael Bellesiles, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS 
OF A NATIONAL GUN CULTURE (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000). That book, which won the Bancroft 
Prize, deemed the premier award for a work of American history, is, unfortunately, still to be found in many 
libraries, especially university libraries. That book, however, has been discovered to be a fraud; the Bancroft Prize 
has been withdrawn, the author has found it necessary to resign from his former university and is now reported to be 
considering a future in high school teaching. “Prize for Book Is Taken Back From Historian,” THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, December 14, 2002 [Section C; Business/Financial Desk; Page 4, Byline: Robert F. Worth]; “The disarming 
of a bogus scholar” ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Nov. 24, 2002 by Alan Bock.; James Lindgren, "Fall From 
Grace: 'Arming America' and the Bellesiles Scandal", 111 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2195-2249 (2002); James 
Lindgren & Justin Heather, "Counting Guns in Early America", 43 WM. & MARY L. REV., 1777-1842 (2002). 
 91 Lane, MURDER IN AMERICA supra, pp. 48 and 59-60. 
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Homicide only began rising markedly in the two decades before the Civil War.92 By that time the 
universal militia was inoperative and the universality of American gun ownership had 
disappeared as many people in long-settled peaceful areas did not hunt and had no other need for 
a firearm.93 
Then came the Civil War which acquainted vast numbers of men with modern rapid-fire 
guns and then, in its aftermath, provided a unique opportunity to acquire them. Before the Civil 
War reliable multi-shot rifles or shotguns did not exist and revolvers (though they had been 
invented in the 1830s) were so expensive as to be effectively out of reach to most of the American 
populace.94 The Civil War changed all that. Officers on both sides had to buy their own revolvers 
and side arms were issued to non-commissioned officers generally, and also to those ordinary 
 
92 Id. 107, 344. 
 93 The enthusiasm modern gun advocates express for the ancient militia far exceeds the enthusiasm felt by 
the Englishmen and Americans who were actually subject to the obligations involved. Guns were expensive items 
even for those owners who were supplied them by the colonies since the cost was required to be paid back over time. 
And the duty of militia drill was a constant source of irritation to men who had little time for leisure and urgent need 
to devote their time to making a living for themselves and their families. By the turn of the Nineteenth Century at the 
earliest the universal militia was in desuetude replaced in the 1840s by colorfully garbed volunteer formations whose 
activities were far more social than military. 
 94 Due to lack of sales Colt went bankrupt in 1840. It revived only with sales to officers and the military 
during the Mexican-American War (1846-48), and was sustained through the 1850s by sales to wealthy Americans 
and Europeans. See generally, Joseph G. Bilby, CIVIL WAR FIREARMS: THEIR HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND, TACTICAL USE AND MODERN COLLECTING AND SHOOTING 157 (1996), Lee Kennett 
& James LaVerne Anderson, THE GUN IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA (London, 
Greenwood, 1975) at 90, Lane, MURDER IN AMERICA, 109. Colt's sales flourished as his revolver was adopted 
by foreign armies and was widely sold to officers and the wealthy in England and Europe (ibid.), especially after 
Colt's prize-winning exhibit at the 1851 Great Industrial Exhibition in London. Joseph. G. Rosa, COLONEL COLT - 
LONDON (Arms & Armour Press, 1976), ch. 1 (Colt and the Great Exhibit). 
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soldiers who were in the artillery, cavalry and dragoons.95 How many revolvers this involved is 
suggested by the fact that in all over two million men served in the Civil War U.S. Army at 
various times while the Confederates had over half that number.96 
At war’s end the U.S. Army and Navy were left with vast numbers of surplus revolvers, 
both those they had purchased and those captured from Confederate forces. As the Army 
plummeted to slightly over 11,000 men,97 hundreds of thousands of military surplus revolvers 
were sold to jobbers at rock bottom prices. In addition, of course, when their enlistments were up, 
 
95 See generally CIVIL WAR FIREARMS, supra, ch. V. The revolvers involved were by no means all Colts: 
"the Federal government also purchased large numbers of Remington, Starr and Whitney revolvers, as well as the 
guns of other [American] makers, including the bizarre looking Savage with its second 'ring trigger' which cocked 
the arm, and the sidehammer Joslyn." Id. at 158. Vast numbers were also purchased in Europe where, in the first 15 
months of the war, the Union bought over 738,000 firearms (including long arms as well as revolvers). Allan R. 
Miller & Peter Maslowski, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 217 (N.Y. Free Press, 1984). In addition to cavalry, dragoon and artillery units, some Union infantry units 
were issued revolvers and many enlisted infantrymen in other units bought their own.  
 Confederate cavalry were sometimes armed with older-pattern double-barrelled pistols, or even shotguns, 
for lack of revolvers. Colt sold revolvers to the South (until forbidden to do so), and the Confederacy manufactured 
its own revolvers and purchased as many as possible from European sources. Id.
96 These are just estimates. While for the Union Army at least somewhat reliable figures exist for how many 
served at any one time (see next footnote), that number is not co-extensive with how many served in total. Some 
Union soldiers served throughout the war, re-enlisting when their original enlistments were up. Others mustered out, 
being replaced with new recruits. Others yet deserted long before their terms were up, again requiring replacements. 
Some scoundrels enlisted just for the enlistment bonus, and deserted as soon as they could; some of these went 
through the enlistment-then desertion process multiple times, collecting a new bonus under a new name time after 
time. THE WORLD ALMANAC (1986) p. 333 gives a figure of 2,128,948 for the Union Army, 84,415 for the 
Marines and estimates the Confederate Army at 600,000 to 1.5 million. 
 97 "The names of 1,000,516 officers and men were on the [U.S. Army's] roles on May 10, 1865; by [1866, 
the draft had ended and] .... only 11,043 volunteers remained...." Russell F. Weighley, HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES ARMY 262 (N.Y. Macmillan, 1967). 
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or when they were mustered out at war's end, former officers and soldiers had walked off with 
hundreds of thousands of both revolvers and rifles. This included many of the new repeating rifles 
the Union had bought (over the fervent objections of short-sighted military procurement officers) 
at the command of President Lincoln who had tested the Spencer rifle himself. After his death the 
Army reverted to the single-shot rifle, disposing of all its multi-shots at surplus, thereby ruining 
Spencer by glutting the market.98 
Thus over the immediate post-Civil War years "the country was awash with military 
pistols" and rifles of the most modern design.99 And the next decade through the end of the 
Century saw the introduction and marketing of the "two dollar pistol" (as in "hotter than"). These 
were very cheap handguns manufactured largely out of pot metal. Besides being sold locally such 
“Suicide Specials” were sold nationwide through Montgomery Ward catalogs from 1872 on and 
by Sears from 1886. They were priced as low as $1.69, and were marketed under names like the 
"Little Giant" and the "Tramp's Terror."100 
Thus the period 1866-1900 saw a vast diffusion of commercial and military surplus 
revolvers and lever action rifles throughout the American populace. Yet, far from rising, homicide 
 
98 Kennett & Anderson, supra, at 92-93. 
 99 David T. Courtwright, VIOLENT LAND: SINGLE MEN AND SOCIAL DISORDER FROM THE 
FRONTIER TO THE INNER CITY (Harvard U. Press, 1996) at 42. 
 100 Kennett & Anderson, supra, pp. 98-100. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, June 14, 1879, p. 381 contains an 
advertisement for COD purchasing of the $2.50 "Czar" revolver, presumably an attempt to capitalize on the S&W 
"Russian", a very high quality weapon S&W manufactured for the Russian government and sold through the 1870s. 
The 1884 Price List-Firearms Catalog for N. Curry & Brother, arms dealers of San Francisco, lists prices from $2.00 
for the 7 shot "Fashion" and Blue Jacket" revolvers to $2.50 and $3.50 for the "Kitemaug" and "Ranger" revolvers to 
various Colt and Smith & Wesson revolvers selling at from $15.00 to $17.00. 
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seems to have fallen off sharply from the 1870s through the end of the 19th Century.  
 
3. SUMMARY OF MACRO-HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE DARK AGES TO THE 20th 
CENTURY 
Whether or not guns were the cause, homicide steadily declined over a period of five 
centuries coincident with their invention and diffusion throughout the continent. From the 17th 
through the early 19th Centuries in America murder was rare, and rarely involved guns, though 
gun ownership was universal by law and "colonial Americans were the most heavily armed 
people in the world." By the 1840s gun ownership had declined but homicide began a spectacular 
rise through the early 1860s. From the end of the Civil War to the turning of the 20th Century 
America experienced a tremendous spurt in ownership of higher capacity revolvers and rifles than 
had ever previously existed but murder sharply declined.101 
In sum, more guns = more death is not borne out by the historical evidence available for 
the period of the Middle Ages to the 20th Century.  Yet this must be viewed with caution. While 
one may describe broad general trends in murder rates and in the availability of firearms, it is not 
possible to do so with exactitude before recent times. Not until the late 19th Century in England, 
and the mid-20th Century in the U.S. are there detailed data on homicide, and information about 
the distribution of firearms is even more sparse. For instance, Lane's generalizations about the 
rarity of gun murder and low American murder rates in general are subject to some dispute. Roth 
 
101 Lane, MURDER IN AMERICA, supra, pp. 155, 181, 307, Eric Monkkonen, MURDER IN NEW YORK 
CITY (Berkeley, U.C., 2001). 
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has shown that early American murder rates and the extent to which guns were used in murder 
varied greatly between differing areas and time periods.102 
4. LATER AND MORE SPECIFIC MACRO-HISTORICAL EVIDENCE. 
Malcolm presents reliable trend data on both gun ownership and crime in England for the 
period 1871-1964. Significantly, these trend data do not at all correlate as the mantra would 
predict: Violent crime did not increase with increased gun ownership nor did it decline in periods 
in which gun ownership was lower.103 
In the U.S. a decade from the mid-1960s to the mid-‘70s saw the murder rate double. The 
fact that this coincided with vastly increasing gun sales was taken by many as proof positive that 
more guns = more death. That, however, did not at all follow. It was at least equally possible that 
the causation was reversed, i.e., that the decade’s spectacular increases in murder, burglary and all 
kinds of violent crimes caused fearful people to buy guns.104 The dubiousness of blithely 
assuming that the gun sales caused the rise in murder rather than the reverse might have been 
clearer had it been known in the 1960s- ‘70s that virtually the same murder rate increase was 
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occurring in gun-less Russia.105 Clearly there was no basis to assume guns were the reason for the 
American murder rate rise when the Russian murder rate exhibited the same increase, yet virtually 
none of those murders involved guns.  
 Reliable information on both gun ownership and murder rates in the U.S are available only 
for the period from the end of WWII on. Significantly, the decade from the mid-‘60s to the mid-
70s is a unique exception to the general pattern. That pattern is that, decade-by-decade, the 
number of guns owned by civilians has risen steadily and dramatically – but murder rates 
nevertheless remained stable or even declined. As for the second half of the 20th Century, and 
especially its last quarter, a study comparing the number of guns to murder rates found that over 
the 25 year period 1973-97 the number of handguns owned by Americans had increased by 163%, 
and the number of all firearms by 103%. Yet over that period the murder rate declined by 
27.7%.106 It continued to decline in the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 despite the addition in each 
year of two-three million handguns, and c. 5 million firearms of all kinds. By the end of the year 
2000 the total American gunstock stood at well over 260 million – 951.1 guns for every 1,000 
Americans – but the murder rate had returned to the comparatively low level prior to the increases 
of the mid-‘60s-‘70s period.107 
Kleck, TARGETING GUNS, supra at 79-81. 
105 In 1965, the Russian homicide rate stood at 5.9 per 100,000 population while the American rate was 5.4. 
As of 1975 both Russian and American rates had nearly doubled, the Russian to 10.3 and the American to 9.7. Again, 
we are indebted to Prof. Pridemore for the year-by-year Russian rates from 1965 to 1999, and the fact that very few 
Russian murders involve guns. 
 106 Don B. Kates & Daniel D. Polsby, "Long Term Non-Relationship of Firearm Availability to Homicide" 4 
HOMICIDE STUDIES 185-201 (2000) at 190-91. 
 107 We are indebted to Prof. Kleck (personal communication 2/26/2003) for post-1997 sales figures.  
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 In sum, these data for the decades since the end of WWII are further evidence failing to 
bear out the more guns = more death mantra. These and related data have been summarized as 
follows:  
 
The per capita accumulated stock of guns (the total of firearms 
manufactured or imported into the United States, less exports) has increased in 
recent decades, yet there has been no correspondingly consistent increase in either 
total or gun violence... About half of the time gun stock increases have been 
accompanied by violence decreases, and about half the time [they have been] 
accompanied by violence increases, just what one would expect if gun levels had 
no net impact on violence rates.108 
5. GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNS WITHIN NATIONS 
Once again, if more guns = more death and fewer guns = less death, areas with higher gun 
ownership should in general have more murder than those with less gun ownership in a single 
nation. But, in fact, the reverse pattern prevails in Canada,109 "England, America and Switzerland, 
[where the areas] with the highest rates of gun ownership are in fact those with the lowest rates of 
 
108 TARGETING GUNS, supra, p. 18, emphasis added 
109 Philip C. Stenning, "Gun Control - A Critique of Current Policy," POLICY OPTIONS, v. 15, p. 15 
(1994). 
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violence."110 A recent study of all counties in the United States has again demonstrated the lack of 
relationship between the prevalence of firearms and homicide111.
This inverse correlation (more guns-less crime) is one of several which seem to contradict 
more guns = more death. To reiterate, for decades the gun control lobby has emphasized that, in 
general, the American jurisdictions most restrictive of guns have consistently had the highest 
violent crime rates and those with the fewest restrictions have the lowest violent crime rates.112 
For instance, robbery is highest in jurisdictions which are most restrictive of gun ownership.113As 
to one specific control, the ban on carrying concealed weapons (CCW) for protection, “violent 
crime rates were highest in the states [that flatly ban CCW], next highest in those that allowed 
local authorities discretion [to deny CCW] ...  permits, and lowest in states with nondiscretionary” 
CCW laws under which police are legally required to license every qualified applicant.114 Also of 
 
110 Joyce Lee Malcolm, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE (Cambridge, Harvard: 
2002); see also BBC News, “Handgun Crime ‘Up’ Despite Ban,” noting that English areas with very low numbers of 
firearms have higher than average gun crime while areas with the highest levels of legally held guns do not. 
111 Gary Kleck, Kovandzic, Tomislav and Mark E. Schaffer. “Gun Prevalence, Homicide Rates and 
Causality: A GMM Approach to Endogeneity Bias,” CEPR DISCUSSION PAPERS, Number 5357. Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, London, 2006. 
 112 See http://www.nraila.org/FactSheets.asp?- FormMode=Detail&ID=18 
http://www.nraila.org/FactSheets.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=17 and 
http://www.nraila.org/FactSheets.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=73. 
 113 Philip J. Cook, "The Effect of Gun Availability on Robbery and Robbery-Murder: A Cross Section Study 
of 50 Cities" 3 POL. STUD. REV. ANN. 743, 776-778 (1979).  
 114 Lott, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME, supra, p.  43. As a practical matter, where police retained discretion 
to grant or deny licenses/permits, they often are only issued to celebrities, the very wealthy and others having 
extraordinary political influence. Permit holders in jurisdictions with discretionary issuance have included Eleanor 
Roosevelt, Arthur Ochs Sulberger (publisher of the NEW YORK TIMES) William F. Buckley, Donald Trump, 
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interest are the extensive National Institute of Justice-sponsored opinion surveys among 
incarcerated felons, both juvenile and adult: Large percentages of the felons replied that they 
often feared potential victims might be armed and aborted violent crimes because of that fear115 – 
and "the felons most frightened 'about confronting an armed victim' were those from states with 
the greatest relative number of privately owned firearms."116 
6. GEOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS: EUROPEAN GUN OWNERSHIP AND MURDER RATE 
COMPARISONS  
This topic has already been addressed as some length in connection with Tables 1-3 supra, 
which contain the latest data available to us. Tables 4-6, which appear at the end of the paper 
contain further, and somewhat more comprehensive, data from the mid and early 1990s.117 These 
further reinforce the point that murder rates are determined by basic socio-cultural and economic 
factors rather than mere availability of some particular form of weaponry. Consider Norway, its 
 
various DuPonts and Rockefellers, Dianne Feinstein, and actors Tom Selleck, Sean Penn, and James Caan. See, e.g., 
Melanie Lefkowitz, Newsday, Sept. 30, 2002, “Cleared to Carry in [New York] City: [Carry] Permit Totals Drop, 
But Not for Notables.” In nondiscretionary states, c. 4-10% of the adult population apply for licensure and must be 
granted it upon a showing that they are properly trained and law abiding, regardless of whether they have special 
influence. 
 115 Sheley & Wright, IN THE LINE OF FIRE and Wright & Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED 
DANGEROUS, both supra. 
 116 Id. at 151. 
 117 Tables 3-6 were previously published as appendices to Don B. Kates, “The Limits of Gun Control: A 
Criminological Perspective” in Timothy Lytton, ed., SUING THE FIREARMS INDUSTRY: A LEGAL BATTLE 
AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 
2005) 
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neighbors Sweden, and (across the Baltic and North Seas respectively) Holland and Denmark. 
Norway has far and away Western Europe’s highest household gun ownership (32%), but also its 
lowest murder rate. Holland has the lowest gun ownership in Western Europe (1.9%), and 
Sweden lies midway between (15.1). Yet the Dutch murder rate is half again higher than the 
Norwegian, and the Swedish rate is even higher yet, though only slightly. (See Table 5 infra.) 
 These comparisons are reinforced by Table 6, which gives differently derived (and non-
comparable) gun ownership rates, overall murder rates, and rates of gun murder, for a larger set of 
European nations.118 Reference to Table 6 reveals that though Sweden has more than double the 
rate of gun ownership as neighboring Germany, and more gun murders, it has 25% less murder 
overall. In turn, Germany, with three times the gun ownership rate of neighboring Austria as well 
as a higher gun murder rate, has a substantially lower murder rate overall. Likewise, though 
Greece has over twice the per capita gun ownership rate of the Czech Republic, Greece has 
substantially less gun murder – and less than half as much murder overall. Although Spain has 
over 12 times more gun ownership than Poland, the latter has almost a third more gun murder, 
and its overall murder rate is almost twice Spain’s. And then there is Finland, with 14 times more 
gun ownership than neighboring Estonia. Yet Estonia’s gun murder and overall murder rates are 
about seven times higher than Finland’s. 
 
7. GEOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS: GUN OWNERSHIP AND SUICIDE RATES 
118 Table 6 covers different years than Table 5, its comparative gun ownership figures derive from 
government records rather than survey data, and it gives rates for gun murders, a datum which is not available in the 
sources from which Table 5 is taken. See the Explanatory Note which precedes Table 6. 
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Though this article devotes much less space to suicide, the mantra more guns = more 
death/fewer guns = less death is also used to argue that "limiting access to firearms could prevent 
many suicides.”119 Once again, this assertion is directly contradicted by the studies of 36 and 21 
nations (respectively), which find no statistical relationship: overall suicide rates were no worse 
in nations with many firearms than in those where firearms were far less widespread.120 
Consider the data as to European nations in Tables 5 and 6 infra. Sweden with over twice 
as much gun ownership as neighboring Germany, and 1/3rd more gun suicide, nevertheless has 
the lower overall suicide rate. Then there is Greece, which has nearly three times more gun 
ownership than the Czech Republic, and somewhat more gun suicide. Yet the overall Czech 
suicide rate is 250+% higher than the Greek.  Spain has over 12 times more gun ownership than 
Poland, yet the latter’s overall suicide rate is more than double Spain’s. Tragically, poor, 
wretched Finland has over 14 times more gun ownership than neighboring Estonia, and a great 
deal more gun-related suicide. But how tragic is that for Finland, really, when in fact Estonia 
turns out to have much the higher suicide rate than Finland overall? 
The simple fact is that there is no relationship evident between the extent of suicide and 
the extent of gun ownership. People do not commit suicide because they have guns available. In 
 
119 Quoting from Arthur Kellermann et al, "Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership" 327 NEW 
ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 467 (1992); to the same effect see Antoon Leenars, et al. "Controlling the 
Environment to Prevent Suicide: International Perspectives," 45 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 633-644 (2000). 
120 See note 30 supra. 
54 
the absence of firearms, people who are inclined to suicide just kill themselves some other way.121 
Two examples seem as pertinent as they are poignant. The first concerns the 1980s increase in 
suicide among young American males, an increase that, although relatively modest, inspired 
perfervid denunciations of gun ownership.122 What these denunciamentos failed to mention was 
that suicide of teenagers and young adults was increasing throughout the entire industrialized 
world – regardless of gun availability and often much more rapidly than in the U.S. The only 
unusual aspect of U.S. suicide was that it involved guns. The irrelevancy of this to the increase in 
suicide is evident since suicide among English youth actually increased 10 times more with "car 
 
121 See the thorough review of the issues in ch. 8 of  TARGETING GUNS, supra. See also W.H.O.-SMALL 
ARMS supra. p. 3 showing that around the world “firearms accounted for only one-fifth of all suicides, just ahead of 
poisoning... [self-] strangulation, i.e.  (hanging) was the most frequently used method of suicide.” 
122 See, e.g.: J.H. Boyd, "The Increasing Rate of Suicide by Firearms." 308 NEJM 872-874 (1983); J.A. 
Mercy, et al. "Patterns of Youth Suicide in the United States." 62 EDUCATIONAL HORIZONS 124-127 (1984); 
CDC, "Youth Suicide in the United States, 1970-1980" (Atlanta: CDC 1986); J.H. Boyd & Eve K. Moscicki, 
"Firearms and Youth Suicide", 76 AM. J. PUB. HLTH. 1240 (1986); Deane Calhoun, "From Controversy to 
Prevention: Building Effective Firearm Policies", INJURY PREVENTION NETWORK NEWSLETTER, Winter, 
1989-90 at p. 12; D.M. Endy, et al., "Estimating the Effectiveness of Interventions to Prevent Youth Suicides." 25 
MEDICAL CARE S57-S65 (1987); Sloan, Rivara, et al., "Firearms Regulations and Rates of Suicide: A Comparison 
of Two Metropolitan Areas", 322 NEW. ENG. J. of MED. 369 (1990), James A. Mercy & Mark Rosenberg, et al., 
"Public Health Policy for Preventing Violence," 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS 7, 28 (1993); Daniel W. Webster & 
Modena E. H. Wilson, "Gun Violence Among Youth and the Pediatrician's Role in Primary Prevention," 94 
PEDIATRICS 617, 618ff. (1994) and the following CDC Reports by Lois A. Fingerhut and or Lois A. Fingerhut and 
Joel C. Kleinman, et al: "Firearm Mortality Among Children and Youth" Advance Data #178 (CDC National Center 
for Health Statistics, 1989); "Firearm Mortality Among Children, Youth, and Young Adults 1-34 Years of Age, 
Trends and Current Status: United States 1979-1988", MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT (March 14, 
1991) CDC National Center for Health Statistics; and "Firearm Mortality Among Children, Youth, and Young 
Adults 1-34 Years of Age, Trends and Current Status: United States, 1985-1990", CDC Advance Date No. 231 
(March 23, 1993).  
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exhaust poisoning [being] the method of suicide used most often...."123 By omitting such facts the 
articles blaming guns for increasing American suicide evaded the inconvenience of having to 
explain exactly what social benefit nations with few guns got from having their youth suicides 
occur in other ways. 
Even more poignant are the suicides of many young Indian women born and raised on the 
island of Fiji. In general, women are much less likely to commit suicide than are men.124 This is 
true of Fijian women as well, but not of Indian women in the large part of Fiji’s population that is 
of Indian ancestry. As children, these Indian women are raised in more-or-less loving and 
supportive homes. But upon marriage they are dispersed across the island to remote areas where 
they live with their husbands’ families. These families are not loving to them and are, in fact, 
often overtly hostile, a situation the husbands do little to mitigate. Indian women on Fiji have a 
suicide rate nearly as high as that of either Indian or Fijian men, a rate many times greater than 
that of non-Indian Fijian women.125 It also bears emphasis that the overall Fijian suicide rate far 
exceeds the U.S. rate. 
The method of suicide is particularly significant. Fijian women of Indian ancestry commit 
suicide without using guns, perhaps because guns are unavailable. About half these women hang 
themselves. But the other half die (in agony) from consuming the agricultural pesticide paraquat. 
 
123 Hawton, K., "By their own young hand," BRIT MED J 1992; 6833 (304): 1000. See also   "Teenage 
Deaths Increasing Across Europe", CJ-INTERNATIONAL, Nov. - Dec. 1991, p. 4 (publication of U. of Ill.-
Chicago; Office of International Criminal Justice).  CJ Europe, 1991. 
124 Data posted on the World Health Organization website reveal, for instance, the following suicide rates: 
American men 18.6 - American women 4.4; Austrian men 29.3 - Austrian women 10.4; Belgian men 31.3 - Belgian 
women 11.7; Danish men 20.9 - Danish women 8.1. 
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The recommendation of the author whose article chronicles all this is so myopic as to almost 
caricature the more guns = more death mindset: To reduce suicide by Indian women, she 
recommends that the Fijian state stringently control paraquat.126 Apparently she thinks decreased 
access to a horribly agonizing means of death will reconcile these women to a life situation they 
regard as unendurable. At the risk of belaboring what should be all too obvious, restricting 
paraquat will not improve the lives of these poor women.  It will only reorient them towards 
hanging, drowning or some other means of suicide. 
 Guns are just one among numerous available deadly instruments. So banning guns, or 
making them less available, cannot reduce the amount of suicide. Once again, all it reduces is the 
number of suicides by firearms. Suicide committed in other ways increases to make up the 
difference. To reiterate, data from across the world show no relationship between the extent of 
suicide and the extent of gun ownership. People do not commit suicide because they have guns 
available. They kill themselves for reasons they deem sufficient, and in the absence of firearms 
they just kill themselves in some other way. 
 (The foregoing should not be deemed to address the issue of whether suicide is “rational.” 
Doubtless many suicides occur for reasons that might seem irrational to other people but perfectly 
rational to the person actually committing the act. Vincent Van Gogh and Virginia Woolf killed 
 
125 Ruth H. Haynes, "Suicide in Fiji: A Preliminary Study," 145 BRIT. J. PSYCHI. 433 (1984). 
126 Ibid. More or less the same situation seems to prevail in the substantially-Indian populated nation of Sri 
Lanka (formerly Ceylon). It "has one of the highest suicide rates in the world. Suicides are especially frequent 
among young adults, both male and female. Compared to the U.S., the suicide rate for males in Sri Lanka is nearly 
four times greater; the female rate is nearly 13 times greater. The most common mode of suicide is ingestion of liquid 
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themselves rather than continuing to endure agonizing mental problems which had proven 
incurable over a period of years. How can anyone who has not endured their pain judge their 
solution? Given that suicide has been chosen, under a variety of circumstances, for instance by 
Demosthenes, Hannibal, Cato the Younger, Cleopatra, Castlereagh, Ernest Hemingway, and 
Robert LaFollette, Jr., observers who have less-than-overwhelming egotism may hesitate before 
branding it invariably irrational. In any event, the point is that, regardless of whether suicide is 
rational or irrational, it does not appear to be controllable by so trivial a measure as restricting 
access to firearms.) 
 
RECENT EXPERIENCE IN BRITISH COMMONWEALTH127 NATIONS 
Capping decades of severe restrictions on gun ownership throughout the British 
Commonwealth, the last half of the 20th century saw several of the countries in the 
Commonwealth impose Draconian firearm laws, confiscating hundreds of thousands of firearms 
from owners law abiding enough to turn them in.128 Canada brought in universal gun registration 
and banned small handguns, the United Kingdom banned all handguns, Australia banned semi-
 
pesticides." Lawrence R. Berger, "Suicides and Pesticides in Sri Lanka," 78 AM. J. PUB. HLTH. 826 (1988) 
(emphasis added). 
127 The British Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 53 independent and sovereign nations almost all 
of which were former colonies or territories of Great Britain. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/ 
128 Gary A. Mauser, MISFIRE: FIREARM REGISTRATION IN CANADA (Vancouver, B.C., Fraser 
Institute: 2001), and Gary A. Mauser, THE FAILED EXPERIMENT: GUN CONTROL AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN 
CANADA, AUSTRALIA, ENGLAND AND WALES, Vancouver, BC: The Fraser Institute, 2003 
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automatic firearms, and both the Republic of Ireland129 and Jamaica attempted sweeping firearm 
bans. These gun laws were adopted amid predictions that they would stem violence, but, as we 
will show here, none of these measures can be shown to have successfully reduced criminal 
violence, homicide or suicide in any of these countries130.
The Commonwealth’s experiments in severe gun restriction were quite expensive, 
although governments have tried to hide these costs.131 Canada’s experience provides a specially 
condign lesson. The government that brought in Canada’s universal gun registry program in 1995 
with a target date of 2001 had estimated its cost at $2 million and assured the public that it could 
be implemented by civil servants without diverting Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
resources from handling crime. In 2003 after repeated postponements the program continued far 
behind schedule, with its’ estimated final cost being $2 billion and having diverted tens of 
thousands of hours of RCMP time. In 2002 a political scandal erupted when the Auditor-General 
 
129 The Republic of Ireland will be included along with the countries in the British Commonwealth even 
though Ireland, upon gaining its independence in 1921, declined the invitation to join the Commonwealth. We have 
done this because of the close historic and geographic association between Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
130 One member of the British Commonwealth bucked this trend. In 1983, New Zealand abandoned its 
efforts to register rifles and shotguns as the police found it was too costly to operate and rarely useful in catching 
criminals. For a thorough discussion of crime trends and firearms control in New Zealand, see REVIEW OF 
FIREARMS CONTROL IN NEW ZEALAND, REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMMISSIONED 
BY THE MINISTER OF POLICE, June 1997, by Judge T.M. Thorpe, Queen’s Printer, Wellington, New Zealand.  
131 The Canadian government considers the cost of the firearm registry a cabinet secret and has to date 
refused to divulge the complete costs. See Garry Breitkreuz, “Mr. Speaker, in June 1999 the government used the 
provision for total exclusion of cabinet confidences under section 69 of the Access to Information Act to keep 172 
pages of gun registry budget information a state secret.” Tuesday, June 13, 2000, HANSARD, 
http://www.garrybreitkreuz.com/bills.html, and NEWS RELEASE, November 24, 2003, 
http://www.garrybreitkreuz.com/breitkreuzgpress/guns102.htm 
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of Canada found that program cost already exceeded $1 billion dollars but asserted she could not 
estimate ultimate cost because the Justice Ministry was now refusing to provide her further 
documentation132.
One aspect of England’s recent experience deserves note, given how often and favorably 
advocates have compared English gun policy to American over the past 35 years133 An often 
unstated issue in this notoriously emotional debate was the effect of the Warren Court’s (and later 
judicial) restrictions on police powers. Critics of these decisions pointed to soaring American 
crime rates and argued simplistically that such decisions were a cause, or at least were hampering 
police in suppressing crime. But to some supporters of these judicial decisions the example of 
England argued that the solution to crime was to restrict guns not civil liberties. To gun control 
 
132 The Auditor General is circumspect in this passage, but her meaning is clear: “(10.48) In our view, the 
financial information provided for audit by the Department does not fairly present the cost of the Program to the 
government. Our initial review found significant shortcomings in the information the Department provided. 
Consequently we stopped our audit ...” Sheila Fraser, (2002) Office of the Auditor General of Canada. AUDITOR 
GENERAL REPORTS 2002. CHAPTER 10. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - COSTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE 
CANADIAN FIREARMS PROGRAM. December 2002, p 1. (http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/02menu_e.html). The Auditor General’s comments led to a judicial inquiry and 
criminal investigations. 
 
133 See, e.g. Robert Drinan, S.J., “Banning Handguns Would Reduce Crime,” reprinted in Tamara Roleff, 
GUNS & CRIME at 45-46 (San Diego, Greenhave, 1999),  Irwin Bloch, “Gun Control Would Reduce Crime,” 
197ff, reprinted. in  David Bender, WOULD GUN CONTROL REDUCE CRIME (San Diego, Greenhaven: 1989); 
Nelson “Pete" Shields, GUNS DON'T DIE, PEOPLE DO ch. 4 (N.Y.: Arbor House, 1981);  Amitai Etzioni & 
Richard Remp, TECHNOLOGICAL SHORTCUTS TO SOCIAL CHANGE 135 ff.  (N.Y.: Sage, 1973);  Ramsey 
Clark, CRIME IN AMERICA pp.  86-90 (N.Y., Simon & Schuster: 1970), Carl Bakal, NO RIGHT TO BEAR 
ARMS [see numerous index entries under “England”] (N.Y. Paperback Library: 1968), National Coalition to Ban 
Handguns "A Shooting Gallery Called America", undated, unpaginated pamphlet.  
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advocates England, the cradle of our liberties, was a nation made so peaceful by strict gun control 
that its police did not even need to carry guns. America, it was argued, could attain such a 
desirable situation by radically reducing gun ownership, preferably by banning and confiscating 
handguns. 
 The results discussed earlier contradicted those expectations.  On the one hand, despite 
constant substantially increasing gun ownership, in the 1990s the U.S. saw progressive and 
dramatic reductions in criminal violence. On the other hand, the same period in the United 
Kingdom saw constant and dramatically increasing violent crime to which England’s response 
was ever-more drastic gun controls including, eventually, banning and confiscating all handguns 
and many types of long guns.134 Nevertheless, to reiterate, criminal violence so continued its 
rampant increase that by 2000 England surpassed the U.S. to become one of the developed 
world’s most violence-ridden nations.  
 Ironic though this is, the English governments’ desperate responses to the crime crisis are 
even more so. Predictably ever-heavier penalties are proposed for the ever-increasing crimes 
involving the guns no one is supposed to have any more. More ominously, since England has no 
written constitution, the government is able to jettison civil liberties to a far greater extent than 
anything American critics of the Warren Court ever dreamed of. The accused's privilege to 
confront witnesses is now circumscribed to allow convictions based on hearsay testimony; and, 
when juries nevertheless foolishly acquit, the accused can just be retried -- for the privilege 
 
134 Malcolm, GUNS AND VIOLENCE, ch. 6. We should clarify that the twin trends toward more violent 
crime and more gun control began long before the 1990s, and just culminated then. See Greenwood as quoted in the 
text accompanying fn. 33 supra. 
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against double jeopardy prosecution has been abolished.135 Other steps being considered include 
revising England’s censorship laws in the hope that gun crime can be reduced by banning violent 
movies, videos, video games and rap music.136 
To conserve the resources of the inundated criminal justice system police no longer 
investigate burglary and “minor assaults”.137 As of 2006, if the police stumble across a mugger, 
other robber or burglar, or other "minor" criminal, the policy is to release them with a warning 
rather than to arrest and prosecute them138. It used to be that English police vehemently opposed 
the idea of armed policing. Today ever more police are being armed. Justifying the assignment of 
armed squads to block roads and carry out random car searches, a police commander asserts: “It is 
a massive deterrent to gunmen if they think that there are going to be armed police.”139 How far is 
 
135 “Britain Plans Criminal Justice Changes to Favor the Victims,” NEW YORK TIMES, July 18, 2002, 
Section A; Page 8. 
136 “Gun fears spur U.K. review,” REUTERS/VARIETY dispatch, London, Jan. 15, 2003. This can occur in 
England because, once again, it has no written constitution to protect free expression. 
137 “Gun-free UK: Don't bother about burglary, police told.” LONDON TELEGRAPH, December 1, 2003: 
“Police have been ordered not to bother investigating crimes such as burglary, vandalism and assaults unless 
evidence pointing to the culprits is easily available, The Telegraph can reveal. Under new guidelines, officers have 
been informed that only "serious" crimes, such as murder, rape or so-called hate crimes, should be investigated as a 
matter of course. In all other cases, unless there is immediate and compelling evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA 
material, the crime will be listed for no further action.” http://news .telegraph.co. uk/news/-
main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/01/12/nburg12.xml&sSheet=/news/2003/01/12/ixnewstop.html/news/2003/01/12/nburg
12.xml: 
138 “‘Let burglars off with caution’ police told.” 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=381799&in_page_id=1770
139 See, e.g. REUTERS dispatch, London, Sept 7, 2002: “British police will set up armed checkpoints on the 
streets of London to crack down on drug-related gun crime." 
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that from the rationale on which 40 American states have enacted laws giving qualified, trained 
citizens the right to carry concealed guns? Indeed, news media editorials have appeared in 
England arguing that civilians should be allowed guns for defense and the government recently 
decided to reconsider the 1997 handgun ban.140 
140 Column by LONDON DAILY MAIL columnist Simon Heffer: “If the state fails us, we must defend 
ourselves.” LONDON TELEGRAPH, February 2, 2002; "Dunblane handgun ban under review," 
Aug.11, 2002, /www.scotlandonsunday.com/index.cfm?id=874132002. 
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1. Quasi-experiments: Do Restrictive Gun Laws Reduce Violent Crime? 
This section examines the claim that restrictive gun laws are effective in bringing down 
violent crime. The logic is straight forward. If the approach to violent crime generally adopted by 
countries in the British Commonwealth is more effective than that adopted by the U.S., then, 
other factors being equal, the crime rates in those countries should fall faster than the 
corresponding crime rate in the US. On the other hand, if restrictive gun laws are not as effective 
in reducing violent crime, there may be no difference in the trends, or the crime rates in the U.S. 
may even fall faster. The uniqueness of the criminal justice system in the United States makes the 
US a singularly valuable point of reference.141 To recap our earlier discussion in the 
INTRODUCTION: not only are criminal penalties typically more severe in the United States, 
often much more severe, even including capital punishment, but also conviction and incarceration 
rates are usually much higher than they are in the British Commonwealth.142 Perhaps the most 
striking difference is that the United States is one of the few countries to encourage qualified 
citizens to carry concealed handguns for self defence.  
Two sets of countries in the British Commonwealth are examined in this section. First, we 
 
141 For a more thorough discussion of the differences among a wide variety of countries, including the 
United States, see David Kopel, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY, Prometheus Books, 
1992 
142 These points have been made most tellingly by Patrick Langan and David Farrington (1998), CRIME AND 
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1981–96. NJC 169294 (October). 
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, who compare the criminal justice systems of 
the United States with that of England and Wales. See also Marie Gannon, “Crime Comparisons between Canada and 
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will look at three countries that introduced laws restricting general access to firearms in the 
1990s. Next, we will compare the crime trends in two countries that attempted near 
comprehensive firearms bans in the 1970s. In each of these countries, we shall compare the trends 
in violent crime, including homicide trends, with the general decline in violent crimes in the 
United States over the same time period. 
It is important to remember that the goal clamed for these firearm laws is to create a safer 
society by reducing total criminal violence, not just gun violence. As we have argued earlier in 
this paper in ASKING THE WRONG QUESTION, the determinants of murder and suicide are 
basic social, economic and cultural factors not the prevalence of any particular deadly 
mechanism. Thus it follows that to evaluate the effectiveness of firearms legislation, one must 
measure the increase or decrease in criminal violence as a whole. The question that needs to be 
addressed is not whether gun laws cause a drop—or an increase—in firearms crime. If gun crime 
declines but crimes with other weapons just increase so that the number of violent crimes does not 
decline gun control fails.143 
The crucial question is whether or not the gun laws improve public safety. There is no 
social benefit in decreasing the availability of guns if the result is only the increase of other means 
of committing suicide and murder with no decrease in the number of lives lost. Note that even if 
firearm regulations were successful in causing firearms crime to drop, other violent crimes could 
 
the United States.” JURISTAT 21, 11 (December, 2001) for a thorough discussion of the differences in measurement 
of crime rates in the United States and Canada. 
143 There is little evidence that gun laws are effective in reducing homicide or violent crime. See for 
example, Joyce Malcolm, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, (2002). 
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increase to such an extent that society might actually be less safe. The evidence, as we will show, 
indicates that all that is accomplished by the removal of one particular means from people who 
are motivated to suicide or murder by social, economic, cultural or other circumstances is their 
killing themselves or others by some other means.  
In assessing the impact of legislation on crime rates, it is necessary to examine changes 
over time. Obviously, directly comparing national averages is irrelevant. It is an entirely different 
question whether the Canadian average for a particular crime rate is higher (or lower) than that of 
the United States or England. Such patterns speak to the historical and cultural differences among 
nations, not to the effectiveness of recent firearm legislation144. Evaluating legislation is 
analogous to evaluating a new diet. If we want to determine if our new diet is effective, we must 
ask if our weight changes after the diet is introduced. While it may be reassuring, it is logically 
irrelevant to our diet’s efficacy that other people are fatter than we are.  
 
Of course, even if crime rates decline after the introduction of a new firearm law, this does 
not prove that the legislation caused the decline. There may be alternative explanations for the 
change that are more persuasive. The question of causality is never fully answered even in 
complex econometric analyses or in experiments conducted under strict laboratory conditions. All 
that anyone can do is to attempt to eliminate most of the alternative explanations. By examining 
 
144 Arguably, one of the reasons that violent crime rates tend to be higher historically in the United States 
and Jamaica than in Canada is that slavery played a smaller role in Canada than in either Jamaica or the United 
States. Slavery had been abolished in Canada by 1810 by Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe. For more 
information about slavery in Canada, see Michael Craton, SINEWS OF EMPIRE: A SHORT HISTORY OF 
BRITISH SLAVERY, Anchor Books, Garden City, NY, 1974.  
66 
the trends in crime rates in several diverse countries, we conclude that the alternative factors can 
be discounted. The fact is that in none of these cases, despite the variety of countries examined, 
do violent crime rates drop as a consequence of the introduction of more restrictive firearm laws.  
Comparative studies rely upon police statistics. There are several reasons for this decision 
even though there are well-known limitations to police data145. The first is that police statistics are 
the only data that are consistently available for the range of countries that we are considering over 
the full thirty years. Second, not only are victim surveys often unavailable for some countries,146 
but also the most important index of criminal violence is homicide, as to which victim surveys are 
not possible. Third, despite their high reputation, victim interviews are of strikingly uneven 
quality both across nations and within nations across time. Last, police statistics are published 
annually while victim surveys are only conducted irregularly, at most every five years. 
The first countries we shall compare are Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Each 
of these countries introduced Draconian general laws in the 1990s that severely restricted access 
to firearms by citizens in an effort to improve public safety. Not only do these countries share the 
common history of the British Commonwealth, they are large western democracies with a 
modern, functioning police force, customs bureaucracy, and a highly educated population. If any 
countries could be expected to be able to control firearm misuse through the legal system, these 
 
145 Police statistics have been criticized because they are subject to changes in the public’s willingness to 
report crimes, and, equally important, to variations in police recording practices. 
146 Excellent victim surveys exist in Australia, Canada, the United States, as well as in England and Wales, 
but not in Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, or Jamaica. See Sian Nicholas, David Povey, Alison 
Walker and Chris Kershaw, CRIME IN ENGLAND AND WALES 2004/2005. Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 
National Statistics, London, England, July 2005. 
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countries should qualify.  
 
The United Kingdom147 
Firearm policy in the United Kingdom has been driven by sensationalized coverage of 
firearm murders for over 15 years. First, in August 1987, a deranged man stalked through the 
small town of Hungerford, England for eight hours shooting people seemingly at whim. By the 
time the killing was over, Michael Ryan had killed 16 people and wounded another 14, before 
shooting himself148. Media attention focused almost exclusively on how Ryan had managed to 
obtain firearms legally. In hindsight other matters seem of at least equal interest. For instance the 
fact that English police are disarmed meant they could not stop him. In contrast, such massacres 
have been prevented or stopped in the U.S. and Israel where citizens have guns149.
Almost 10 years later, in 1996, in Dunblane, Scotland, Thomas Hamilton, who was known 
to the police as mentally unstable, walked into a primary school with his legally registered 
 
147 The United Kingdom consists primarily of three large jurisdictions, England and Wales, governed for the 
most part as a single entity, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The crime trends of the Channel Islands and other 
nearby islands associated with the U.K. will not be examined here. 
148 Joyce Lee Malcolm. GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE, Harvard Press, 2002, p 
201. 
149 See Lott, BIAS AGAINST GUNS, ch. 6. In one case, the school principal stopped a shooting in his 
school by retrieving his lawfully owned handgun, “A principal and his gun,” Wayne Laugesen, BOULDER 
WEEKLY, http://www.BoulderWeekly.com. Other examples are available on http://www.keepandbeararms.com/.
“Armed Israeli civilian stops terrorist attack,” FOX NEWS CHANNEL, 4 November 2001. A large percentage of 
the Israeli population has permits for carrying concealed handguns. Abraham Rabinovich, “Israel OKs 60,000 more 
gun permits in terror fight,” WASHINGTON TIMES, 7 March 2002 and “Army issuing 40,000 handgun permits,” 
IsraelNN.com, 6 March 2002.  
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handguns and murdered 16 young children and their teacher. Before killing himself, he wounded 
another 10 students and three teachers.150 The media were outraged that licensed target shooters 
were able to own handguns, not that the police failed to follow the rules that should have 
prevented granting the killer a firearm permit. According to information presented to the Cullen 
Commission, Hamilton had been refused membership in several gun clubs, which had requested 
the police to revoke his permit. The police had not acted on these complaints151.
The Firearms (Amendment) Act of 1988 was brought in by the Conservative government 
following the Hungerford incident, and the Firearms (Amendment) Act of 1997, which banned all 
handguns, was introduced by the Labour government following the shooting in Dunblane in 
1996152. Unfortunately, these Draconian firearm regulations have not curbed crime.   
 
England and Wales 
Assessing the impact of this legislation requires examining each of the principal 
jurisdictions of the UK in turn. England and Wales are administered as if they were a single 
jurisdiction; taken together, England and Wales comprise about 88% of the UK population.  
Police statistics show that England and Wales are enduring a serious crime wave. In 
 
150Malcolm, op cit, p 203. 
151 See THE CULLEN COMMISSION, TRIBUNALS OF INQUIRY. INCIDENT AT DUNBLANE 
PRIMARY SCHOOL ON 13 MARCH 1996 BEFORE THE HON. LORD CULLEN, Glasgow, Scotland (1996). 
Available from http://www.open.gov.uk/. 
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contrast to North America, where the homicide rate has been falling for over 20 years, the 
homicide rate in England and Wales has been growing over the same time period. (See Figure 1). 
In the 1990s alone, the homicide rate jumped 50%, going from 1.1 per 100,000 in 1990 to 1.6 per 
100,000 in 2000, and the homicide has remained higher, averaging 1.7 per 100,000 since 2001153 
As for violent crime in general, police statistics show a huge increase since the handgun 
ban, and since 1996 violent crime has been more serious than in the United States (See Figure 2). 
16 The rate of violent crime has jumped from 400 per 100,000 in 1988 to almost 1,400 per 100,000 
in 2000. (An unknown amount of the recent increase may be attributed to changes in the recording 
rules in 1998 and 1999.) In contrast, not only are violent crime rates lower in the United States, 
there they are continuing to decline154.
The Home Office has also tightened up on enforcement of regulations to such an extent 
that the legitimate sport-shooting community has been virtually destroyed. For example, shotgun 
permits have fallen almost 30% since 1988155 (See Figure 3). The British Home Office admits 
 
152 Colin Greenwood, Colin, “Labour’s Gun Plan.” SHOOTING TIMES AND COUNTRY MAGAZINE 
April 12, p 8, 2001; R.A.I. Munday and J.A. Stevenson. GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE DEBATE BEFORE LORD 
CULLEN. (Essex, Eng., Piedmont: 1996). 
153 Home Office (2001). CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES, 2000. Norich, England: 
Queen’s Printer; JURISTAT: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics pamphlet “Homicide in Canada, 2001” by Mia 
Dauvergne at p 3; “Homicide in Canada, 2002” by Josee Savoie at p 3; “Homicide in Canada, 2003” by Mia 
Dauvergne at p 3 (Table titled Homicide Rates for Selected Countries, 2002); and “Homicide in Canada, 2004” by 
Mia Dauvergne at p 3 (Table titled Homicide Rates for Selected Countries, 2004). 
154 Home Office 2001, op cit.; Federal Bureau of Investigation (2003). UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 
TABLE 1: INDEX OF CRIME, UNITED STATES, 1982–2001. Digital document available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/01cius.html.
155 Greenwood, op cit,  
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that only one firearm in 10 used in homicide was legally held156 (See Figure 4). But, there is little 
pressure from within bureaucratic and governmental circles to discontinue the policy of disarming 
responsible citizens who hold their firearms for target shooting or for taking game for the table, 
after some centuries of being allowed to do so by the law.  
 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Figures 1 - 4. England and Wales 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
Clearly, there is no evidence that firearm laws have caused violent crime to fall. The 
firearm laws may even have increased criminal violence by disarming the general public. Despite 
banning and confiscating all handguns, violent crime—and firearm crime—continue to grow. The 
number of violent crimes involving handguns has increased from 2,600 in 1997/1998 to 3,600 in 
1999/2000. Firearm crime has increased 200% in the past decade. At the same time, violent crime 
and homicide continue to fall in the United States.  
 
Scotland  
Scotland has almost 9% of the total population of the United Kingdom. Firearms laws are 
essentially the same in Scotland as in England, despite differences between the English and 
Scottish legal systems. Historically, Scotland has its own police and judiciary. Scottish semi-
independence was further recognized with devolution in 1998 and the creation of a Scottish 
 
156 Home, Office, op cit, 2001, p 
71 
Parliament with very limited powers157. Any criminal legislation that is intended to apply to 
Scotland as well as to England and Wales has to be achieved by adding a distinct appendix to 
legislation, or by passing a separate Act for Scotland. Nevertheless, the criminal law in Scotland 
is nearly identical to that in England and Wales.  
As can be seen in Figure 5, the crime trend in Scotland resembles that in England and 
Wales. The restrictive firearms laws have failed to slow down murderers; homicides continue to 
increase. Prior to 1997, there were 104 homicides per year for the previous ten years. 1997 was an 
exceptionally low year, with only 90 homicides, but homicides have continued to increase. Since 
the handgun ban, there have been 110 homicides each year through 2003, but for the past three 
years (2001-2003) there have been 114 homicides per year.158 
Violent crime in general is also increasing. This is evident in both police statistics and 
victim surveys. Violent crime has increased from 14,500 in 1994 to over 15,000 in 2001, 2002 
and 2003. Over the same time period, rape and attempted rape has also increased from under 
6,000 per year to over 6,500 per year159. A recent victim survey, conducted as part of a United 
Nations sponsored survey of crime victims in 21 countries, identified Scotland as one of the most 
 
157 Gillian Peele. GOVERNING THE UK, THIRD EDITION, Blackwell, Oxford, UK, p. 417; Phil Cocker 
and Alistair Jones, op. cit, 2002, pp. 252-254 
158 Scottish Executive, HOMICIDE IN SCOTLAND, 2003 – STATISTICS PUBLISHED. Justice 
Department, Criminal Justice Division, 24 November 2004. Note that the increase in the frequency of homicide 
represents a real growth in the Scottish homicide rate because the population of Scotland decreased by 
approximately 1% between 1992 and 2003.  
159 Scottish Executive, RECORDED CRIME IN SCOTLAND, 2003. Criminal Justice Series, CrJ2004/5, 
June 2004. 
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violent places in Europe160.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++ 




Northern Ireland constitutes the third and smallest political unit of the United Kingdom to 
be analyzed here. Northern Ireland was created in 1921, at the same time as the Irish Free State 
(now the Republic of Ireland or Eire) gained its independence161. It has less than 3% of the total 
population of the United Kingdom, but its population is growing rapidly. Although Northern 
Ireland has had its own parliament in Stormont from the onset, this was suspended in 1972 when 
the British government instituted Direct Rule as a result of the tremendous growth in sectarian 
violence162. British troops had been sent into Northern Ireland in 1969 in order to separate the 
warring paramilitary forces and to re-establish order.  Under Direct Rule, Northern Ireland was 
governed from London by a Secretary of State.  
Since 1994, there have been great strides towards peace, and accordingly, Northern 
Ireland has once more been granted increasing powers of self-rule. Elections to the Northern 
 
160 Katrina Tweedie. “Scotland tops list of world’s most violent countries,” THE TIMES, London, 
September, 19. 2005. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1786945,00.html
161 In 1949, the Irish Free State changed its name to Eire or the Republic of Ireland.  
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Ireland Assembly were re-introduced in 1998. Northern Ireland has substantially the same 
criminal code as the rest of the United Kingdom, but the sectarian violence since 1969 has led to a 
number of important differences.  These include generally much more restrictive firearms laws, 
but with one important, possibly crucial, difference.   
As a matter of Home Office policy, Firearm Certificates ceased to be issued anywhere in 
the UK for self-defence in the 1950s. Uniquely in Northern Ireland, police officers were routinely 
allowed to carry personal protection firearms until this exception was ended in 1969 as a result of 
the Hunt Report.  The original policy was reinstated about 10 years later, with little or no 
publicity, as a result of the dramatic increase in the number of disarmed police officers who had 
been murdered163.
Concurrently, Home Office policy during the 1980s allowed the issuance of Firearm 
Certificates, specifically for personal protection, to a range of officials perceived to be especially 
at risk: for example, politicians and retired and off-duty police, prison warders and military 
personnel.  It is possible that this policy contributed to the substantial reduction in the murder rate 
that followed, although this has yet to be evaluated.   
In response to a question in the UK Parliament in 1998 about extending the imminent 
pistol ban to Northern Ireland, the government stated that there were some 10,000 personal 
 
162 Phil Cocker and Alistair Jones, op. cit, 2002, pp. 262 -  
163 Sutton, M. 1994. AN INDEX OF DEATHS FROM THE CONFLICT IN IRELAND, 1969 – 1993. 
Belfast, Beyond the Pale Publications, cited in Brewer, et al., 1997.  
The Patten Report on policing in Northern Ireland notes: 
"… (W)e were reminded on several occasions that, when the RUC had been disarmed after the Hunt report of 1969, 
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protection Firearm Certificates in issue, compared with 2,000 issued for sporting purposes.  It is 
widely understood that the UK government wished to extend the ban to Northern Ireland and 
were only persuaded not to when several politicians in Northern Ireland made it very clear that, if 
their Certificates for personal protection firearms were withdrawn, they would cease to support 
the so-called “Good Friday Agreement” of 1998, which the UK government regarded as a vital 
part of the peace process.  The UK government therefore reluctantly agreed to Northern Ireland 
being excluded from the pistol ban.  
As may be seen in Figure 6, Northern Ireland is the only segment of the UK where the 
murder rate is declining. It is also interesting to note that many other crime rates are lower in 
Northern Ireland than in the rest of the UK.  The reasons for these differences are not readily 
apparent.  The policy of issuing Firearm Certificates for personal protection is probably not a 
significant factor, as they are only issued to a very small proportion of the population164. The 
emergency police powers, including the Draconian police presence, are probably a much more 
important factor. Another and equally persuasive hypothesis, given that the vast bulk of the 
murders in Northern Ireland are political, is that government negotiations with the paramilitary 




there was a spate of attacks on police resulting in the deaths of several officers and leading to the re-introduction of 
personal protection weapons.” 
164 Arguably, since a criminal’s fear of being shot is stronger than his fear of being caught by police, the 
presence of even a small percentage of armed citizens is sufficient to dissuade some criminals. Although this is more 
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Figure 6. Murder Trend in Northern Ireland 
++++++++++++++++++++ 
Australia 
Publicity surrounding a multiple murder triggered recent changes in Australian firearm 
policy. In Port Arthur, Tasmania, on April 28, 1996, Martin Bryant, a mentally deranged man, 
went on a rampage murdering anyone he encountered. The media afterwards focused almost 
exclusively on the killer’s use of military-style semi-automatic firearms. The police arrived, 
surrounded the isolated building, and began negotiations. When he tried to escape, he was quickly 
captured165. In all, he killed 35 people and seriously injured another 18. He was tried and 
sentenced to life in prison166. Confusion remains over many of the details of this incident, 
including how Bryant came to have the firearms he used, and whether or not the police response 
was adequate. No Royal Commission has ever examined the incident. The media focus on the 
type of firearms used at Port Arthur has diverted public concern over police procedures.  
Following garish media coverage of the Tasmanian killings, in 1997 the Australian 
government brought in sweeping changes to the firearm legislation. The new controls on firearms 
introduced included the prohibition and confiscation of over 600,000 firearms, mostly semi-
automatic or pump-action firearms, from their licensed owners, as well as new licensing and 
 
likely to be an effective remedy in the United States where there is a significant fraction of armed citizens. This is 
much less likely in Northern Ireland where so few people carry concealed weapons for protection. 
165 See Bellamy, Patrick (2003). MARTIN BRYANT. Digital document available at 
http://www.crimelibrary.com/serial/bryant. 
166 See Guirguis, Peter (2003). CRIME ANALYSIS: PORT ARTHUR MASSACRE. Digital document 
available at www.boredofstudies.cjb.net 
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registration regulations167.
Unfortunately, these new firearm regulations do not appear to have made the streets of 
Australia safer. Consider homicide rates. Homicide involving firearms has declined but murders 
with other weapons just increased so the total homicide rates have remained basically flat from 
1995 through to 2001168. In a subsequent report, Dr. Mouzos reports that, despite the declining 
firearm homicides, there is an increase in multiple-victim incidents. However, reports show that 
homicide rates have declined in both 2003 and 2004169. It is not clear what is driving these recent 
declines. Nevertheless, homicide rates remain at a historic high. Shortly after World War II, the 
Australian homicide rate was around 1 per 100,000. Since then, it has climbed until it peaked at 
2.4 per 100,000 in 1988 and another high of 2.0 in 1999170.
The decline in homicide rate in the United States stands out against the essentially stable 
homicide rate in Australia (See Figure 7). In the US, the homicide rate has dropped 32% between 
1995 and 2001, while it has slid only 10% in Australia. At the same time Australia banned and 
confiscated legally owned firearms, the number of states in the U.S. that allow their residents to 
 
167 For further information on the firearms legislation, see Lawson, James B. (1999). “New National Gun 
Laws—Are They Cost Effective?” INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS REVIEW 51, 4 (December): 27–28, and 
Peter Reuter and Jenny Mouzos (2002). “Australia: A Massive Buyback of Low-Risk Guns.” Paper presented to the 
American Society of Criminology, Chicago. 
168 Mouzos, Jenny (2001). HOMICIDE IN AUSTRALIA, 1999–2000. Trends and Issues 187 (February). 
Canberra, ACT: Australian Institute of Criminology. 
169 Mouzos, Jenny (2003). HOMICIDE IN AUSTRALIA 2001–2002. Research and Public Policy Issues 46. 
Canberra, ACT: Australian Institute of Criminology. 
170 Graycar, A. (2001). “Crime in Twentieth Century Australia.” In YEAR BOOK AUSTRALIA, 2001, 
(ABS cat. no. 1301.0; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001): 477–95. Digital document available at 
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/other/centenary/. 
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carry concealed handguns increased from 28 to 40 out of the total of 50 states.  
 
+++++++++++++++++++ 
Figures 7 & 8 Australian Trends 
+++++++++++++++++++ 
 
The divergence between Australia and the United States is even more apparent when one 
considers violent crime (See Figure 8). While violent crime is decreasing in the United States, it 
continued to increase in Australia for four years following 1997, although it has recently started to 
decline. In 2003, the violent crime rate had decreased by 22% in the U.S. since 1997, while it had 
increased by over 14% in Australia171. Assault rates have jumped from 623 per 100,000 in 1996 
to 815 per 100,000 in 2002, and easing just slightly to 798 per 100,000 in 2003. Robbery jumped 
from under 90 per 100,000 prior to 1997 up to 137 per 100,000 in 1991 before returning to pre-
1997 levels in 2004. Despite the recent decline in violent crime in Australia, it is illogical to credit 
the 1997 firearm law for this drop given that violent crime did not decline for four years following 
the gun law.  
The destruction of the confiscated firearms cost Australian taxpayers an estimated 
$AUS500 million and has had no visible impact on violent crime172. The costs of the confiscation 
do not include the costs of bureaucracy, which, as has been shown in Canada, can be 
 
171 Violent crime is defined differently in the two countries, so they cannot be compared directly. The 
primary differences lie in how assault and particularly sexual assault are defined. In addition, in 2004, Australia 
withheld reporting on crimes of assault due to a concern over the definitional variance across reporting states.  
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considerable. Most likely in a bid to deflect possible criticism, the governments have made it 
difficult for the public to assess the full cost of this program. Robbery and armed robbery rates 
continued to rise after 1997. Armed robbery has increased 166% nationwide—jumping from 30 
per 100,000 in 1996 to 50 per 100,000 in 1999173. The homicide rate has remained remarkably 
stable, while the share of firearm homicide involving handguns – which have also come under 
heavily increased restrictions – has doubled in the past five years174. The proposed solution to the 
failure of the 1997 gun regulations is to pass even more restrictions on handguns. This is all the 
more remarkable because in Australia, as in Great Britain and Canada, few firearms used in 
homicide are legally held; in 1999/2000 only 12 out of 65 (18%) were identified as being misused 
by their legal owner175.
Canada 
As in other countries, recent changes in firearm policy were precipitated by a media frenzy 
over a multiple murder. On December 6, 1989, Marc Lepine, born Gamil Gharbi, went to the 
University of Montreal campus, where he wandered around the halls of the engineering building 
shooting people he encountered while shouting hatred for feminists. In one classroom, after 
 
172 Lawson, 1999, op cit. 
173 Australian Institute of Criminology (2001). AUSTRALIAN CRIME, FACTS AND FIGURES, 2000. 
Canberra, ACT: Australian Institute of Criminology. 
 Mouzos, Jenny, and C. Carcach (2001). WEAPON INVOLVEMENT IN ARMED ROBBERY. Research and 
Public Policy Issues 38. Canberra, ACT: Australian Institute of Criminology. 
174 Mouzos, 2001, op cit. 
175 Mouzos, 2001, op cit.  
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sending the men from the room, Gharbi shot the remaining women. In all, he killed 14 women 
and wounded another 13 students, including four men, before he finally shot himself (Jones 
1998). Even though Gharbi encountered almost one hundred students and at least three teachers, 
no one tried to stop the murderer. It is very difficult for unarmed civilians to resist an armed 
criminal. 
An investigation by the Montreal coroner severely criticized the police for their 
inadequate response176. The police did not even arrive until after the killings were over. After 
taking 30 minutes to arrive at the university campus, the police could not find the engineering 
building. The coroner’s office stated that the type of weapon used was not a significant factor in 
the murders. Nevertheless, political activists used this hideous crime to launch a campaign that 
promoted tighter firearm restrictions as the way to protect women from male violence. The 
obvious misogyny of the crime energized Canadian feminists to become politically active. As a 
result, Canada twice introduced sweeping changes to its firearms laws, first, in 1991, under the 
Conservative government and then again, in 1995, under the Liberals, before the first changes 
had been fully implemented. These changes included prohibiting over half of all registered 
handguns in 1995, and requiring the registration of long arms (i.e., rifles and shotguns) in 
1998177.
The Canadian homicide rate has remained essentially stable since the mid-1990s after 
declining during the early 1990s. in 2004 it began to increase again. Over this same time period, 
 
176 MacDonald, Don (1990). “Killer Lepine Had 60 Shells Left: Report on Montreal Massacre.” 
EDMONTON JOURNAL (May 15): A1. 
177 Handguns have been required to be registered in Canada since 1934. See the Canadian Firearms Centre for a 
description and history of Canadian firearm legislation. http://www.cfc-cafc.gc.ca/pol-leg/hist/firearms/default_e.asp 
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firearm murders have also declined, although this has been partially compensated by increases in 
murders involving knives and clubs. While the Canadian homicide rate has stabilized, in the 
United States the homicide rate has plummeted (see Figure 9). Between 1991 and 1997, the 
homicide rates in both Canada and the U.S. fell by 32%. Since 1997, the homicide rate in the 
United States has fallen an additional 19%, from 6.8 per 100,000 in 1991 to 5.5 per 100,000 in 
2004, while the Canadian rate has remained stable at 1.8 – 1.9 per 100,000.   
The contrast between the rate of criminal violence in the United States and that in Canada 
is much more dramatic (see Figure 10). Over the past decade, the Canadian violent crime rate has 
stayed basically stable while, in the United States during the same time period, the rate of violent 
crime has slid from 600 per 100,000 to 500 per 100,000178.
++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Figures 9 & 10. Canadian Trends 
+++++++++++++++++++ 
 
The Canadian experiment with firearm regulation is moving towards farce. Although it 
was originally claimed that this experiment would cost only $2 million ($C), the Auditor General 
reported in 2001 that the costs of the firearm registry were out of control and would be more than 
$1 billion ($C). Unfortunately, her mandate was limited so she could not examine the entire 
sprawling program. The final costs are unknown but, if the costs of enforcement are included, 
 
178 Gannon, Maire (2001). “Crime Comparisons between Canada and the United States.” JURISTAT 21, 11 
(December). 
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estimates now reach $3 billion ($C). It is important to recognize that the costs of any proposed 
scheme to regulate firearms are significant, and that these costs are not easy to estimate in 
advance, even in a modern, economically developed country such as Canada. More important, the 
introduction of any expensive program, such as universal firearm registration, means that 
reductions must be imposed on expenditures on other policing priorities because of limited 
budgets. In Canada, the police budget was basically frozen the 1990s, that is, after inflation is 
factored in, there has been no real increase in the budget.  
Though the primary purpose of firearms registration is to disarm legally unqualified 
persons the Ministry has discontinued background investigations in order to speed up the 
protracted process. For an unknown period, people presenting a gun for registration have been 
allowed to register it to them apparently on the presumption that they have no criminal 
background to legally disqualify them from owning firearms.179 This has resulted in the RCMP 
announcing that it does not trust the information in the registry180.
Another problem is that a computer glitch has prevented or wiped out an unknown number 
of registrations. An estimated million or more Canadians have failed to register,181 and critics 
 
179 Mauser papers, supra. The $2 billion estimate comes from Prof. Mauser. See also: Garry Breitkreuz, MP. 




180 REPORT OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, Chapter 11, “Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
– Canadian Firearms Program”. 
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20021211ce.html#ch11hd3c 
 181 Mauser, MISFIRE, supra; Jacobs, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK 149, second footnote. 
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claim the glitch precludes prosecuting them since now scoflaws cannot be distinguished from 
registrants whose registrations were lost in the glitch. The Minister replied that the deadline will 
not once again be extended to allow further or re-registrations and any gun owner not recorded as 
having registered would be prosecuted, regardless of the inaccuracies and lacunae in the 
registry.182 
An even more serious problem is that the security of the firearm registry has come under 
question due to a series of large-scale robberies from gun collectors and gun shops in southern 
Ontario. These robberies appear to have been specifically targeted by criminals who had access to 
inside information about the locations of gun collections. According to a former employee of the 
Canadian Firearms Centre, anyone with a home computer, an Internet connection and a little 
patience can hack into the national firearms database and find out who owns guns, where they live 
and what makes and models they possess.183 
The countries considered to this point (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom) merely 
attempted to restrict certain types of firearms or to register firearms. The reader may perhaps ask 
whether a more thorough firearms ban would have been more effective. The next two countries to 
be discussed did in fact attempt to ban the ownership of virtually all firearms. 
 
182 See generally Tim Naumetz, “Glitch wipes out firearms records; No amnesty, minister insists; charges 
impossible, Alliance MP replies,” THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, June 05, 2003 and Canada News Briefs, “Names 
deleted from firearms registry,” ASSOCIATED PRESS June 4, 2003. There is apparently no question that some 
registrations have been lost, but it is unclear and disputed how many were lost and whether the cause was a 
computer “crash” or some different malfunction. 
183 Mark Bonokoski, TORONTO SUN, “In the wake of firearms thefts, it’s possible the gun registry is not as 
secure as touted,” March 10, 2006, p10. Janice Tibbits, MONTREAL GAZETTE, “Gun registry called a breeze to 
hack by ex-webmaster,” March 13, 2006, p A10. 
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In the 1970s, both the Republic of Ireland and Jamaica prohibited virtually all citizens 
from owning firearms. These countries did not simply regulate firearms, or ban a particular type 
of dangerous firearm, but instead they attempted a comprehensive ban of nearly all firearms. Each 
of these countries did so in a desperate effort to break the spiral of violence that had infected it.  
 
The Republic of Ireland184 
Concerned with the rapid rise of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, on 2nd 
August 1972 the Irish Republic issued a Firearms Temporary Custody Order under the 
extraordinary powers it had given itself in the 1964 Firearms Act, Clause 4.  It required no debate 
in Parliament; it became Law as soon as the Minister for Justice issued the Order.185 Virtually all 
firearms were required to be surrendered to the authorities within three days.  
Even though the Irish Republic was not hit as hard as its northern neighbor, the threat was 
perceived as very real and the Irish Government claimed that the risk of the IRA stealing firearms 
from private homes justified the Custody Order186. Nevertheless, the number of murders in the 
Republic of Ireland doubled with the introduction of the Custody Order, from an average of under 
 
184 The Republic of Ireland shares a relatively small island with Northern Ireland. The Republic is a separate 
country that won its independence from Britain in 1921 after a long and bloody struggle. Northern Ireland, also 
called Ulster, is part of the United Kingdom, along with England, Wales and Scotland. There is a substantial tension 
between the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland where there has been a history of long and 
bitter sectarian violence. 
185 This legislation included all handguns, including air guns, and all rifles over .22 caliber. Thus shotguns 
and .22 rifles were excluded.  
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13 murders per year in the years up to and including 1971, to 28 murders in 1972. It remained at 
the new higher average level for the next 20 years, when it started to rise again to its present level 
of about 45 murders per year.187 Even more troubling, the murder of police officers rose 
dramatically as well. When Officer Fallon was murdered in 1970, with an illegal pistol, it was the 
first murder of a police officer for 28 years; but in the 29 years that followed, another 13 officers 
were murdered, all with illegally-held firearms.  With a substantially static population, these 
figures represent dramatic rate increases.  Apart from allowing small caliber hunting rifles 
(calibers up to .270) in 1993, the Firearm Custody Order continued to be enforced right up until 
the summer of 2004188.
Clearly, the evidence linking the doubling of the murder rate to the introduction of the 
Custody Order is only circumstantial. Nevertheless it can clearly be seen from Figure 11 that 
government efforts, including the Draconian Firearms Custody Order and its extension for 32 
years, certainly did not bring the murder rate down. This failure is repeated in many other 
countries.  
Other violent crimes have also increased over the past thirty or so years. Figure 12 shows 
 
186 The recent 30-year period of violence, colloquially called “The Troubles’, began with Civil Rights 
marches in 1968, but rapidly escalated into extreme violence.  Murder in Northern Ireland jumped from 5 per year 
up to 1968, to 123 in 1971, and then to 376 in 1972. 
187 Murder statistics for the Republic of Ireland are given as raw frequencies rather than rates per 100,000 
population. In this way we can avoid any possible error introduced from over (or under) estimating annual 
population increases. The Republic of Ireland has grown but slowly over the past thirty years; the population has 
only increased by 3% over the past 15 years.  
188  We are indebted to Mr. Derek Bernard for supplying the information about the murder of Officer Fallon 
and the detailed nature of the Irish firearms laws. Personal communication, Derek Bernard, October 27, 2005. 
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that the number of robberies jumped up from under 500 per year in the early 1970s to over 2,000 
per year in the early 1980s, and even hit 3,500 in 1995. There were about 3,000 robberies in 2002, 
the most recent year for which statistics are available.  
In hindsight, it appears difficult to believe that banning and confiscating firearms from 
target shooters, hunters and farmers could ever have been imagined to be a successful strategy to 
combat an organized group of terrorists such as the IRA.  Nevertheless the Irish government and 
police steadfastly pursued it for 32 years, regardless of its questionable legality, until forced to 
abandon it by legal action189.
++++++++++++++++ 




In the early 1970s, Jamaica was shocked by a horrifying increase in drug-related violence 
involving guns. The murder rate jumped from between 6 and 7 deaths per 100,000 population in 
the late 1960s to 8 per 100,000 in 1970 and over 11 per 100,000 by 1973. In response, the 
Jamaican government decided to introduce the Gun Court Act in 1974. The Gun Court was a 
drastic institution that eliminated many safeguards in the British legal tradition such as open 
 
189 This legislation has recently been overturned in an Irish court. At the time of writing, the Custody Order 
and associated firearm ban has gone, only to be replaced by massive obstructionism and delay, defended usually on 
the grounds that “a new Firearms Law is on the way and no new authorizations will be issued until it comes out” 
(private correspondence from John Sheehan). 
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hearings and trial by jury (although these were retained for capital cases only).  The standard, 
mandatory sentence for almost any firearm offence, even the illegal possession of a single 
cartridge, was life imprisonment.  Those charged would be imprisoned without bail until tried, 
often for 2 years or more. 
In 1982 and 1983, these conditions were relaxed somewhat.  They nevertheless remain 
draconian to the present day. 
 
++++++++++++++ 
Figures 13 & 14. Jamaica -- murder, shootings 
++++++++++++++ 
 
The results of the Jamaica Gun Court were not encouraging even though the number of 
murders dropped the year the Gun Court was introduced. In 1973, before the Gun Court, 227 
people were murdered, and in 1974, this number fell to 195. Unfortunately, the number increased 
in 1975 to 266 people murdered, and it increased again to 367 people in 1976. Despite the 
continuation of draconian controls on firearms, the number of people murdered has continued to 
increase. In 2001, the most recent year statistics are available, there were 1,139 people murdered 
in Jamaica.  
The raw figures do not tell the full story because of population changes.  Consequently, 
we have calculated murder rates per 100,000 people in the general population. As may be seen in 
Figure 13, the murder rate jumped more than 50% from 9 per 100,000 to over 16 per 100,000 
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from the early 1970s to the mid-1970s and has continued to climb. The gun ban did not reduce on 
gang shootings, and violent crime rates continued to increase. See Figure 14. A few years after the 
introduction of the Gun Court, the murder rate reached a deplorable figure of over 40 deaths per 
100,000, but it soon fell back down to between 18 and 19 per 100,000 for the rest of the 1980s.  
The murder rate began climbing again in the 1990s until it surpassed even the previous high in 
2001 with 43 murders per 100,000. 
It is difficult to argue that the Gun Court was successful. Perhaps more so than most, 
Jamaica is a special case. The two major political parties are rumored to have both consistently 
employed criminal gangs to terrorize their opponents; and, as a result of political corruption, these 
gangs have no trouble in smuggling whatever offensive weapons they desire. In a very real sense 
the gangs associated with whichever party happened to be in power were above the law.  In 
addition, about a third of the killings are claimed to be committed by the police, the vast majority 
in suspicious circumstances, according to Americas Watch, a human-rights group190. Let us 
remember that people accused of nothing more than the ownership of a single bullet lost their 
most basic legal rights and were punished with sentences harsher than those served for murder in 
other societies. As would be expected, there is no shortage of hypotheses about who or what is to 
blame. Each political party blames the other, and both blame the United States. In all the finger 
pointing, it is clear that the crackdown on firearms did not manage to reduce either gun crime or 
criminal violence. 
In summary, no evidence can be found for arguing that firearm prohibitions were effective 
in reducing murder, firearm murder, or violent crime in either the Republic of Ireland or Jamaica.  
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On the contrary, in both countries violent crime, particularly murder, became much worse after 
the bans.  These cases should give pause to anyone who imagines that efforts to impose 
international controls on firearms will be successful in reducing criminal or political violence. 
The tendency in the last decade or two has been for the international community to assume that 
expensive programs such as universal registration will contribute to reducing death rates. 
Unfortunately, this crucial assumption is seldom rigorously examined. In reality, these proposals 
are put forward by naïve activists whose claims are based on wishful thinking rather than on solid 
academic research191.
2. Econometric Analyses of Canadian Gun Laws 
As was seen in the previous section of this paper, trend analysis is valuable for showing 
the overall direction of crime patterns. Unfortunately, this approach does not provide any way to 
evaluate which factors are driving the crime trend. When legislation is introduced many other 
events occur at the same time, and it is quite possible that these other factors are more important 
than the legislation in determining whether crime rates increase or decrease. Econometric models 
enable the analyst to evaluate the unique contribution of each hypothesized causal factor by 
statistically controlling each one. In theory, this allows us to identify the importance of legislative 
changes in any drop (or rise) in the crime rate, amid the backdrop of other factors, such as 
demographic or economic variables, that are conceivably more powerful.  
 
190 Kopel, David B., op cit, 1992, p 269. 
191 Despite dire predictions, neither the homicide nor the violent crime rates dramatically increased when 
New Zealand abandoned its efforts to register rifles and shotguns in 1983. See Thorpe, 1997, op cit. 
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This section briefly summarizes three econometric studies of Canadian firearms laws.192 
Each of these previously published studies uses a time-series model to estimate the effect the 
firearm legislation has on selected crime rates, after accounting for a large and varied selection of 
independent variables193. The first study (the 1992 study) evaluates the effect of the 1977 gun law 
on the homicide rate, and the next two studies (the 2001 and 2002 studies) examine the impact of 
the 1977 and the 1991 firearm laws on robbery rates. In order to determine if firearm laws 
narrowly impact firearm crimes without reducing total robbery rates, three dependent variables 
were included, the total robbery rate as well as the rates of armed robbery and armed robbery 
involving a firearm. The data sets in each of these three models contain sociological, economic 
and police variables spanning 20 to 36 years for all ten Canadian provinces194. These models are 
based upon data sets that are among the largest ever assembled to evaluate Canadian legislation.  
The success of any model to correctly estimate the causal strength of the firearm 
legislation depends upon the confidence one has that the model includes the most important social 
and economic forces. This is critical. One of the subtle but important differences between 
econometric models lies in which independent variables have been incorporated. The omission of 
 
192 Gary Mauser and Richard Holmes, “An evaluation of the 1977 Canadian Firearms Legislation,” 
EVALUATION REVIEW, December 1992, Vol. 16, No 6, pp 603-617; Gary Mauser and Dennis Maki, “Does Gun 
Control Reduce Criminal Violence? An Econometric Evaluation of Canadian Firearm Laws.” Paper presented at 
American Society of Criminology, The Palmer House, November 12 – 16, 2002, Chicago, Illinois; Gary Mauser and 
Dennis Maki, “An Evaluation of the 1977 Canadian Firearms Legislation: Robbery Involving a Firearm,” APPLIED 
ECONOMICS, Vol. 35, March 2003, pp. 423-436. 
193 Technically, it is a pooled cross-sectional, time-series model. See J. Kmenta, (1986). ELEMENTS OF 
ECONOMETRICS, SECOND EDITION, New York:  Macmillan 
194 These variables are discussed in greater detail in the following pages.  
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important independent variables, called ‘specification error,’ may introduce a spurious correlation 
between the gun law and the crime rate being used as a dependent variable. Specification error is 
particularly important in criminology, where theory is too weak to completely identify which 
variables should be included or excluded from regression analyses. 
To avoid specification error, two distinct strategies were employed. First, efforts were 
made to include as wide a set of relevant independent variables as possible in these time-series 
models. Second, a large number of alternative models were used to explore the sensitivity of the 
model on variations of critical decisions. The choice of independent variables was based upon 
those used by other researchers who had been identified after surveying a broad range of similar 
studies. Data availability was the most important limitation to the diversity of independent 
variables that could be included. The breadth of our independent variables will increase the power 
of tests designed to isolate the effects of the firearm legislation while simultaneously reducing the 
probability of erroneously attributing to that legislation the effects of other variables.  
In each model, four classes of independent variables are included: (a) variables pertaining 
to deterrence (e.g., clearance rates), (b) sociological variables (e.g., percentage male youth), (c) 
economic variables (e.g., unemployment rates), and (d) the effect of the firearm law under 
consideration.  Previous studies have demonstrated the importance of variables pertaining to the 
likelihood of deterrence such as arrest and conviction rates195. The clearance rate is a useful index 
 
195 See Erlich, I. (1975). The deterrent effect of capital punishment: a question of life and death. 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 65: 397-417 and J. R. Lott, Jr. and D. Mustard. (1997). Crime, Deterrence, 
and Right -to-Carry Concealed Handguns, JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, Jan,  26(1):1-68 
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of the probability of a perpetrator being arrested and convicted196. Following Lott, the number of 
police effectives was included as a proxy for the probability of a perpetrator being caught, or for 
the differences in the proportion of crimes that are committed which are reported.  
 
A number of researchers have argued that sociological variables, principally sex or ethnic 
differences, are important factors in crime rates197. These models included percentage of male 
youth in the population, various indices of immigration, as well as the aboriginal share of the 
population. Immigration, both internal and international, has been linked with violent crime198. So 
in each of our studies we also took note of unpublished Canadian studies that have looked at 
immigration and crime rates199.
196 Lott, J. R. Jr. (1998). MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME, UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN 
CONTROL LAWS.  University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
197 See particularly, Lenton, Rhonda L. (1989). Homicide in Canada and the USA: A critique of the Hagan 
thesis. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 14(2): 163-178, Ouimet, Marc.  (1999). Crime in Canada and in 
the United States:  A Comparative Analysis. CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY, 
36(3): 389-408, and Williams, Kirk. R. (1984). Economic sources of homicide: re-estimating the effects of poverty 
and inequality. AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. 49: 283-289.  
198  T.R. Gurr,  (1989). Historical Trends in Violent Crime: Europe and the United States, in VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICA, THE HISTORY OF CRIME. Sage, New York, Lane, R. (1989). On the Social Meaning of Homicide 
Trends in America, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, THE HISTORY OF CRIME.  Sage, New York, and Wilson, J. 
Q. and R. J. Herrnstein. (1985).  CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE, Simon and Schuster, New York. 
199 Department of Justice. (1996). A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE 1977 
FIREARMS CONTROL LEGISLATION, ED1996-1e, Queens Printer,  Ottawa,  Ontario,  July, Samuel, T. J, and R. 
F. Santos. (1990). CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS AND CRIMINALITY. Unpublished report.  Employment and 
Immigration, Canada and Thomas, D. (1990).  CRIMINALITY AMONG THE FOREIGN BORN:  PRELIMINARY 
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION. Rough draft.  Ottawa:  Strategic Planning, Immigration 
Policy Branch, Employment and Immigration Canada 
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In these analyses, inter-provincial migration is distinguished from international migration 
in order to determine if their effects differ200. Immigrants may be involved in crime rates both as 
perpetrators and as victims.  Immigration and ethnicity were both found in one study to be 
important factors in the Canadian homicide rate201. Ethnicity is an important factor in identifying 
who commits robbery in both Canada and the United States202. In Canada, aboriginal status has 
been found to be strongly linked with criminal violence and specifically homicide203. All 
independent variables are measured at the provincial level for all ten Canadian provinces.   
 
Study 1 – the 1992 Study. 
The 1992 study undercuts the claim that firearm legislation has caused the Canadian 
homicide rate to decline. In this study, firearm legislation was found to have no significant impact 
on the homicide rate204. See Figure 15.  
This study analyzed the effect of six independent variables on the homicide rate for each 
province from 1968 through 1988. If the 1977 Firearm Law were to be effective in bringing down 
the homicide rate, as the government expected, it would be negatively associated with the 
 
200 Previous research has found that international immigration is significantly correlated with violent crime 
rates. See Gary Mauser and Richard Holmes, 1992, op cit., and Department of Justice, 1996, op cit.  
201 Mauser and Holmes, 1992, op cit.  
202 Desroches, F. J. (1995). FORCE AND FEAR: ROBBERY IN CANADA. Nelson Canada, Scarborough, 
Canada. 
203 Silverman, R. A. and L. Kennedy. (1993). DEADLY DEEDS: MURDER IN CANADA. Nelson Canada, 
Scarborough, Canada. 
204 Mauser and Holmes, 1992, op cit. 
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Canadian homicide rate in this model. As can be seen in Figure 15, the gun law was indeed found 
to be negatively associated with the homicide rate, although not significantly. The other 
independent variables are all in the expected direction and statistically significant. The three most 
powerful independent variables were the percentage of Native Indians205, the percentage of 
international immigrants in a province, and the clearance rate.  
Since all the independent variables are statistically significant, there cannot logically be 
any spurious correlations in this model. Thus, it was concluded that the 1977 firearm law did not 
have a significant impact on the Canadian homicide rate.  
 
+++++++++++++ 
Figure 15. Evaluating the 1977 Gun Law on Homicide Rate 
+++++++++++++ 
 
The next two studies examine the question of whether firearm legislation can reduce 
important types of violent crimes other than homicide, such as robbery and armed robbery.  
 
Study 2 – the 2001 Study. 
The 2001 study found that the 1977 Canadian gun law was positively correlated with 
 
205 In Canada, the amount of federal funding provided to native Indian reserves depends upon their 
population. In order to determine their population, the federal government requires that native Indians be registered.  
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total robbery rates206. This study examined the impact of the gun law upon three related 
dependent variables: (a) armed robbery, (b) armed robberies involving firearms, and (c) total 
robberies for each province from 1974 through 1992.  
Nine independent variables were included in the study in order to ensure that all of the 
important socioeconomic factors had been considered. The power of econometric analysis is that 
the model can statistically account for the most important other factors as co-variates. The most 
powerful independent variables were found to be the percentage of international immigrants in a 
province, the percentage of native Indians, the number of serving police officers per capita, and 
the clearance rate207.
++++++++++++++ 
Figure 16. Evaluating the 1977 Gun Law on Robbery Rates 
+++++++++++++++ 
 
The three dependent variables were analyzed separately, but the results were quite 
similar. Once the effects of the other variables were factored out, the Canadian gun law was 
 
206 Gary Mauser and Dennis Maki, 2003, op cit. This study was conducted in 2001and submitted to the 
journal APPLIED ECONOMICS that same year. Unfortunately, publication was delayed until 2003. 
207 Multicollinearity is always a problem in econometric models. Multicollinearity is the distortion of the 
results by unknown patterns of correlations among the variables in the model. In order to examine the seriousness of 
this problem, the next two models calculated the results for regression models for all possible combinations of the 
independent variables, i.e., all 512 subsets of the 9 variables. This is a powerful way to evaluate the possibility of 
specification error as well. The analysis of the results of these equations strengthened the conclusions. The results 
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found to have a significant effect. The original hypothesis was that the gun law would have a 
negative effect, that is, that restricting access to firearms would tend to reduce robbery and 
armed robbery rates. Unexpectedly, the effect of the gun was found to be positive; just the 
opposite of that hypothesized. In other words, the gun law acted as if it increased criminal 
violence. The effect was marginal, but significant. It was tentatively concluded that the 1977 
firearm law significantly increased robbery and more specifically armed robbery with a firearm.  
Some researchers have argued that restrictive firearms laws generally cause crime rates to 
increase208, while this may well be true, because of the marginality of the result, professors Maki 
and Mauser were reluctant to accept this conclusion without further research. It is always 
possible that an anomalous result may be due to an accidental misspecification of the model. 
Therefore it was decided to conduct a third study.  
 
Study 3 – the 2002 Study.  
The failure of Canadian firearms laws was confirmed in a 2002 study that investigated the 
effects of both the 1977 and the 1991 firearms legislation in the same model209. This involved 
comparing changes over the following time periods: The 1997 law: 17 years before the 1977 law,  
[62 - 78] and 19 years afterwards [79 through 97], and the 1991 law: 30 years before the 1991 
law,  [62 - 92] and 5 years afterwards [93 through 97].  
 
are not a product of any particular combination of IV’s. For further details, refer to Gary Mauser and Dennis Maki, 
2003, op cit. 
208 John R. Lott, Jr, 1998, op cit.  
209 Gary Mauser and Dennis Maki, op cit, 2002. 
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The database in this study differs from those used in earlier papers primarily in its length. 
It is the longest data series ever collected in Canada to evaluate legislation. The data set extends 
from 1962 through 1997, while the database used in the 2003 paper210, only runs from 1974 
through 1992.  
The primary goal of this study was to confirm the finding of our previous study that the 
1977 Canadian gun law actually caused robbery rates to increase. After gradually increasing 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, robbery rates started declining in the 1990s. What could explain 
this pattern? The decline is consistent with the hypothesis that it is due to the firearm legislation. 
However, there were several other factors occurring at the same time that have been hypothesized 
to be the primary driving forces behind robbery rates, e.g., aging population, immigration rates or 
patterns, economic conditions, social conditions, and finally police numbers or activity. If the 
most important factor is the firearm legislation, then statistically controlling the other factors that 
occurred at the same time will allow the effect of the legislation to be revealed more clearly. 
Alternatively, the legislation may not be as powerful as hypothesized. It is logically possible that 
these other factors are more important in causing the observed change. If so, statistical control 
will demonstrate this as well as uncovering the factors that are more important.  
 As had been done in the two previous models, in order to avoid specification error, the 
widest possible set of relevant variables were included in these time-series models. In this model, 
nine other independent variables were included in order to investigate as possible confounding 
factors. As before, the basic question is to discover whether other factors could account for the 
changes in the dependent variable, the robbery rate, rather than the firearm legislation.  
 
210 Gary Mauser and Dennis Maki, 2003, op cit. 
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The results from the 2002 study were clear: the model could not find a significant effect 
from either the 1977 gun law or the 1991 gun law. The results showed that the two most 
important variables were the percentage of registered native Indians and the percentage of young 
males in a province. The foreign immigration rate and the police clearance rate were also 
statistically significant, but were of lesser importance. Almost all of the statistically significant 
relationships were found to be in the expected direction.   
 
++++++++++++++ 
Figure 17. Evaluating the 1977 and 1991 Gun Laws on Robbery Rate 
+++++++++++++++ 
 
In summary, there was no persuasive support for the hypothesis that Canadian firearms 
laws (either the 1977 or 1991 laws) had a significant effect on robbery or homicide rates – either 
positively or negatively. One study, the 2001 study, found that the 1977 law significantly 
increased robbery rates. However, the significance disappeared in a subsequent study, which had 
a larger and more complete database. The failure of the significance of this relationship to survive 
replication suggests that it was an aberrant result.  
The independent variables that were found to have the largest effect in the three studies 
were the provincial percentage of young males and percentage Native Indian. Two other 
independent variables, the percentage of foreign immigrants and the clearance rate, were also 
found to be significantly related to violent crime rates, but the strength of these relationships were 
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not as powerful as the first two independent variables. The remaining independent variables were 
not found consistently to have significant effects. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This article has reviewed a goodly amount of evidence from a wide variety of 
international sources. Each individual portion of evidence is subject to cavil, at the very least the 
general objection that the persuasiveness of social scientific evidence cannot remotely approach 
the persuasiveness of conclusions in the physical sciences. Nevertheless the burden of proof  rests 
on the proponents of the "more guns = more death/fewer guns = less death mantra, especially 
since they propose public policy ought to be based on that mantra To bear that burden would at 
the very least require showing  that a large number of nations with more guns have more death 
and that nations which imposed stringent gun controls achieved substantial reductions in criminal 
violence (or suicide). But those things are precisely what is not demonstrated when a large 
number of nations are compared across the world. 
 Over a decade ago University of Washington public health professor Brandon Centerwall 
undertook an extensive, statistically sophisticated study comparing areas in the U.S. and Canada 
to determine whether Canada's much more restrictive policies had better contained criminal 
violence. When he published his results it was with the admonition: 
If you are surprised by my findings, so are we. We did not begin this research with any 
intent to "exonerate" handguns, but there it is -- a negative finding, to be sure, but a negative 
finding is nevertheless a positive contribution. It directs us where NOT to aim public health 
99
resources.211 
211 Brandon Centerwall, "Homicide and the Prevalence of Handguns: Canada and the United States, 1976 to 
1980", AMERICAN JOURNAL of EPIDEMIOLOGY v. 134 pp. 1245-65 (1991.). Papers reaching similar 
conclusions about Canadian gun control, or aspects thereof, include: Robert Mundt, "Gun Control and Rates of 
Firearms Violence in Canada and the United States" 32 CANADIAN J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 137-153 (1990); David 
B. Kopel, "Canadian Gun Control: Should the United States Look North for a Solution to its Firearms Problem", 5 
TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L. J. 1 (1991), Rich, et al. "Guns and Suicide: Possible Effects of Some Specific 
Legislation" 147 AM. J. PSYCHI. 342 (1990). 
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TABLE 1: Europe & Scandinavia –  Gun Ownership & Murder Rates 
[rates given are per 100,000 people and in descending order] 
 
NATION MURDER RATE RATE OF GUN OWNERSHIP
Russia 20.54  [2002] 4,000 
Luxembourg 9.01 [2002]     c. 0 
Hungary 2.22 [2003] 2,000 
Finland  1.98 [2004] 39,000 
Sweden  1.87 [2001] 24,000 
Poland   1.79           [2003] 1,500 
France 1.65 [2003] 30,000 
Denmark 1.21 [2003] 19,000 
Greece 1.12 [2003] 11,000 
Switzerland 0.99 [2003]  16,000 
 Germany 0.93  [2003] 30,000 
 Norway 0.81 [2001] 36,000 
Austria 0.80  [2002]  17,000 
Notes for Table: 
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 This table covers all the Continental European nations for which the two data sets given are 
both available. In every case we have given the homicide data for 2003 or the closest year thereto 
because that is the year of the publication from which the gun ownership data are taken. That 
publication is the  Graduate Institute of International Studies’, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2003 
(Oxford U. Press 2003) at pp. 64 and 65, tables 2.2 (“Known Civilian Firearms in the European 
Union” and 2.3 (“Known Civilian Firearms in Other European Countries”),  
 The homicide rate data come from the pamphlets JURISTAT: Homicide in Canada 
(Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics) for the years 2001-04.  Each year’s pamphlet gives 
homicide statistics for a dozen or so foreign nations in a section labeled  “Homicide Rates for 
Selected Countries.” This section of the pamphlets gives no explanation of why it selects the 
various nations whose homicide statistics it covers. Moreover, also without explanation, the 
nations covered differ from year to year. Thus, for instance: murder statistics for Germany and 
Hungary are given in all four of the pamphlets (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004); for Russia are given in 
three years (2001, 2002, and 2004), for France in two years (2001 and 2003), and for Norway and 
Sweden in only one year (2001).  
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TABLE 2: Murder Rates of European Nations Which Ban Handguns As Compared to Their 
Neighbors Which Allow Handguns (rates are per 100,000 persons) 
 
Nation Handgun Policy Murder Rate Year
A.  Belarus banned 10.40 late 1990s 
 
[Neighbors for which I have gun law and murder rate data] 
Poland allowed 01.98 2003 
 
Russia banned 20.54 2002 
============================================== 
 
B. Luxembourg banned 09.01 2002 
 
[Neighbors for which I have gun law and murder rate data] 
 
Belgium allowed 01.70 late 1990s 
 
France allowed 01.65 2003 
 




C. Russia banned 20.54 2002 
 
[Neighbors for which I have gun law and murder rate data] 
 
Belarus allowed 10.40 late 1990s 
 
Finland allowed 01.98 2004 
 
Norway allowed 00.81 2001 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
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TABLE 3: Eastern Europe -Gun Ownership  & Murder Rates 
[rates given are per 100,000 people and in descending order]] 
 
NATION MURDER RATE RATE OF GUN OWNERSHIP
Russia 20.54  [2002] 4,000 
 
Moldova 07.81   1,000 
 
Slovakia 02.63  3,000 
 
Romania 02.50  300 
 
Macedonia 02.29  16,000  
Hungary 02.22 [2003] 2,000 
Finland  01.98 [2004] 39,000 
Poland   01.79           [2003] 1,500 
Slovenia 01.79  5,000 
Cz. Republic 01.69  5,000 
Greece 01.12 [2003] 11,000 
Notes for Table: 
This table covers all the Eastern European nations for which we have data as to both gun 
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ownership and murder rates. The gun ownership rate data come from the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies’ SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2003 (Oxford U. Press 2003) at p.65, table 
Known Civilian Firearms in Other European Countries” [“other” than those nations which are in 
the European Union]. For about half the nations in this Table the murder rate data come from the 
pamphlets JURISTAT: Homicide in Canada (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics) for the years 
2001-04., In each case the date of the pamphlet is specified after the murder rate in the Table.. As 
to the other nations listed in the Table, the murder rate data are from the Seventh United Nations 
Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, covering the period 1998 - 
2000 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Centre for International Crime Prevention.). 
++++++++++++++++++++ 
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Table 4 [1]: Intentional Deaths: U.S. vs. Continental Europe Rates 
 
In order of highest combined rate; nations having rates higher than the U.S are indicated by 
asterisk (suicide rate) or + sign (murder rate).  
[N.B. These data should be considered in light of Tables 2 and 3 and the Explanatory Note which 
precedes Table 3.] 
 
Suicide Murder Combined rates 
RUSSIA 41.2* 30.6+ 71.8    
 
ESTONIA 40.1*  22.2+  62.3   
 
LATVIA  40.7* 18.2+ 58.9 
 
LITHUANIA 45.6* 11.7+ 57.3   
 
BELARUS 27.9* 10.4+ 38.3  
 
HUNGARY 32.9* 03.5 36.4 
 
UKRAINE 22.5* 11.3+ 33.8 
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SLOVENIA 28.4* 2.4 30.4   
 
FINLAND 27.2* 2.9 30.1 
 
DENMARK 22.3* 4.9 27.2 
 
CROATIA 22.8* 3.3 26.1 
 
AUSTRIA 22.2* 1.0 23.2 
 
BULGARIA 17.3* 5.1 22.4 
 
FRANCE 20.8* 1.1 21.9 
 
SWITZ. 21.4* 1.1 [2] 24.1 
 
BELGIUM 18.7* 1.7 20.4 
 
U.S.   11.6 7.8  19.4 
 
POLAND 14.2* 2.8 17.0 
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GERMANY 15.8* 1.1 16.9   
 
ROMANIA 12.3* 4.1 16.4   
 
SWEDEN 15.3* 1.0 16.3   
 
NORWAY 12.3* 0.8 13.1   
 
HOLLAND 9.8 1.2 11.0   
 
ITALY 8.2 1.7 09.9   
 
PORTUGAL 8.2 1.7 09.9   
 
SPAIN 08.1 0.9 09.0   
 




1. Based in general on U.N. DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK (1998) as reported in David C. Stolinsky, 
109 
"America: The Most Violent Nation?" MEDICAL SENTINEL v. 5 (# 6 2000) 199-201. It should be 
understood that, though the 1998 YEARBOOK gives figures for as late as 1996, the figures are not 
necessarily for that year. The YEARBOOK contains the latest figure each nation has provided the 
U.N. which may be 1996, 1995, or 1994. 
 
2. The Swiss homicide figure Stolinsky, supra, reports is an error because it combines attempts 
with actual murders. We have computed the Swiss murder rate by averaging the 1994 and 1995 
Swiss National Police figures for actual murders in those years given in R.A.I. Munday & J.A. 
Stevenson, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE DEBATE BEFORE LORD CULLEN (Essex, Eng., 
Piedmont: 1996) at p. 268.  
 
[N.B. The following data should be considered in light of Tables 1 and 3 and the Explanatory 
Note which precedes Table 3.] 
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Table 5 [1]: European Gun/Handgun Violent Death 
 
Suicide Murder % households % households 
with guns with handgun
BELGIUM  18.7  01.7  16.6%  06.8 
FRANCE  20.8  01.1  22.6%  05.5 
W.GERMANY 15.8  01.1  08.9%  06.7[2] 
HOLLAND  09.8  01.2  01.9%  01.2 
ITALY  08.2  01.7  16.0  05.5 
NORWAY  12.3  00.8  32%  03.8 
SWEDEN  15.3  01.3  15.1  01.5 
SWISS  20.8  01.1 [3] 27.2  12.2 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
NOTES 
1. As to derivation of the homicide rates see Table 1, note 1. The data on household firearms 
ownership come from British Home Office figures printed in R.A.I. Munday & J.A. Stevenson, 
GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE DEBATE BEFORE LORD CULLEN (Essex, Eng., Piedmont: 
1996) pp. 30 and 275. 
 
2. Note that the data here are for West Germany and were obtained when that nation still existed as 
an independent entity. See Table 3 infra for later (but differently derived) data for the current 
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nation of Germany.   
 
3. Again, the Swiss homicide figure Stolinsky, supra, reports is an error because it combines 




Explanatory Note to Table 3: It bears emphasis that the following data come from a 
special U.N. report whose data are not fully comparable to those in Tables 1 and 2 
because they cover different years and derive from substantially differing sources.212This 
special report is based on data obtained from the governments of the nations set out 
below, especially data on gun permits or other official indicia of gun ownership in those 
nations.213The data on suicide and murder in those nations also come from their 
governments as do the similar data in Tables 1 and 2, but for later years, and also include 
data on the number of firearm homicides and firearm suicides which are not available 
 
1. The data derive from a much more extensive survey of legal firearms ownership in numerous 
nations which was carried out by researchers provided by the Government of Canada under the auspices of 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
in 1997. The entire survey is published as a report to the Secretary General on April 25, 1997 as 
E/CN.15/1997/4. That report is analysed in some detail in an unpublished paper (“A Cross Sectional Study 
of the Relationship Between Levels of Gun Ownership and Violent Deaths”) written by the leading 
English student of firearms regulation, retired Chief Superintendent of English police Colin Greenwood of 
the Firearms Research and Advisory Service. I am  indebted to Chief Superintendent Greenwood for the 
opportunity to review his paper. Note that in the table which followsI have focused only on European 
nations.  
2. The gun ownership data in Table 2 derive from a random telephone survey on gun ownership in 
various nations. Chief Superintendent Greenwood’s paper is contemptuous of such data, inter alia because 
people may be unwilling to acknowledge owning guns to telephoning pollsters. For similar doubts see Don 
B. Kates & Daniel D. Polsby, "Long Term Non-Relationship of Firearm Availability to Homicide," 4 
HOMICIDE STUDIES 185-201 (2000). But that was in the context of comparing survey data on the 
number of guns owned to production and important data that are unquestionably more comprehensive and 
superior in every way. Chief Superintendent Greenwood himself admits that the special U.N. report data 
are not necessarily comprehensive and are problematic in various other respects. Even assuming they are 
clearly superior to the survey data, the latter cover multiple nations that the special U.N. report does not.  
Given that neither source is indubitable, it seems preferable to have such information on those nations as 
the survey data reveal, rather than no data at all. 
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from the U.N. source used in Tables 1 and 2. 
======================================================= 
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Table 6: European Firearms-Violent Deaths 
 
Suicide Suicide  Murder Murder # of guns 
 W/ gun  W/ gun Per 100,000 
 Population
AUSTRIA n.a. n.a. 2.14 0.53 41.02 [1]  
BELARUS 27.26 n.a 9.86 n.a 16.5 
CZECH R.   9.88 1.01 2.80 0.92 27.58 
ESTONIA 39.99 3.63 22.11 06.2 28.56 
FINLAND 27.28 5.78 3.25 0.87 411.20 [2] 
GERMANY 15.80 1.23 1.81 0.21 122.56 
GREECE 3.54 1.30 1.33 0.55 77.00 
HUNGARY 33.34 0.88 4.07 0.47 15.54 
MOLDOVA n.a n.a 17.06 0.63 6.61 
POLAND 14.23 0.16 2.61 0.27 5.30 
ROMANIA n.a n.a 4.32 0.12 2.97 
SLOVAKIA 13.24 0.58 2.38 0.36 31.91 
SPAIN 5.92 n.a 1.58 0.19 64.69 





[1]. This may well be an undercount because an Austrian licence is not limited to a single 
firearm but rather allows the licensee to possess multiple guns. 
[2]. The source from which Table 2 derives also gives figures for Finland which we have 
omitted there because they are earlier and closely similar except in one respect: instead 
of official ownership figures for guns they give a survey-based figure for households 
having a gun:  23.2% 
 
